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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Regina Nadia Eastman for the Master of Arts in 
English, presented May 9, 1996. 
Title: Creating Knowledge About the Literacy Needs of Juvenile 
Offenders: Reflections on a Qualitative Research Project. 
This thesis attempts to problematize a collective silence around the 
concept of race that developed in a Research Methodology English 510 
course taught by Dr. Gradin, the Director of Writing at Portland State 
University, during the Fall quarter of 1995. The members of ENG 510 
created a qualitative research protocol that was intended to create knowledge 
about the literacy needs of juvenile offenders. This was done in partnership 
with the Juvenile Rights Project, a non-profit advocate for juveniles in the 
Multnomah county courts, and with Portland Youth Redirection, a program 
that offers detention alternatives to juvenile offenders. The research was 
supported by a community-based Learn & Serve Grant through Portland 
State University's Center for Academic Excellence. 
I argue that our methods, critical self-reflection and interviews with 
youth, became fundamentally flawed when we allowed gender issues to 
displace the more difficult discussion around race. This displacement 
resulted in a rejection of the concept of self- reflexivity, thereby reproducing 
a self-serving racist power hierarchy which qualitative research explicitly 
means to expose. I approach this issue through a critique of Enlightenment 
philosophy set within the framework of a post-modern theory that denies 
the truth claims of universalizing metanarratives. 
The thesis analyses and reflects on theory, class dynamics, and interviews 
in the field. It also includes quotes from exchanges and spontaneous 
conversations with youth, juvenile counselors, and class members. 
Recommendations for further research include highly self-reflexive 
discussions on the role of race, class, and gender in the researchers' agendas 
and in their interactions with youth, as well as possible ways to ground the 
research more strongly and with more visible continuity in a community-
related context. Here, Portland State University's Writing Center could 
serve as a nexus. 
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PREFACE 
We Other Victoriansl 
In my thesis journal Marcia Silver asked me, "Why did you choose to write a 
thesis?" "I'm not sure," I mumbled. "Did perhaps the thesis choose you?" Yes, 
that was it. Our research in English 510 on the literacy needs of juvenile 
offenders made me remember every issue on race and class I have ever grappled 
with, and it made me remember that I had been in reform school for a year when 
I was young and that, for all intents and purposes, I was an ex-juvenile offender. 
Both of those memories came back with a vengeance. When this dass invited 
me, even dared me, for the first time in my university experience, to trace 
through writing a connection between my own understanding of the world and 
the academic work I do, I thought that it was both a shocking and a sweet 
demand. I have never situated myself so visibly within a text. I thought it would 
be easy, but the thesis draft was a disaster. Suddenly, I was writing like a novice 
again. I loathed revealing myself. At the same time, the narration of personal 
experience can move beyond confessional narcissisn if one can place it within a 
critical framework where it is in turn related to the material under discussion. 
For me, it made possible a nexus between my academic work and social action. 
Then I reflected back on the activity of writing a thesis. Tradition has it that 
we write academic theses in good Victorian fashion. Our words are trinkets that 
represent our ideas and thus give meaning to the pale innocence of the page. 
This is an essentially romantic activity. But we don't think of the writing of 
critical theses as a romantic activity. We think of it as logically developing 
reasoning on paper. Yet, our writing--a narration structured not altogether 
unlike scientific discourse (just read Krafft-Ebing's 1890 Psychopathia Sexualis, 
certainly a foundational work)--is, to force the issue, the transformation of 
spontaneously overflowing feelings into detached thought recollected in 
·1·ty 2 tranqm t . 
But our class was not at all detached. On the contrary, it re-attached and re-
membered ruptured connections. The confrontational subject demanded that we 
all speak. Even those of us who were afraid to assert ourselves as critical 
thinkers were pushed into a rigorous, critical discussion. This was not the 
stereotypical feminist model that claims women best come to voice in an 
atmosphere of safety, "one in which we are all going to be kind and nurturing," 
like real women.3 The class context was frightening, difficult, and very 
demanding for both women and men. I don't think any one of us, including Dr. 
Gradin, came out of the class talking about how much we had enjoyed the 
experience. And that is as it should be. 
We literary types are often all too comfortable, too complacent, too sure of 
what we know. We are too good at being disembodied mind and universal man. 
We hide our hopes, we hide our fears, we hide our anger, we hide our 
complicity, and, most of all, we hide the passionate desire to express our-selves. 
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I should like to advance an education that makes our world more real rather than 
less real. To do that, I invite the spirit of risk. 
INTRODUCTION 
Science and Racism: How the West was Won 
English .510 in the Fall of 1995 was a Research Methodology course in 
Composition with an added component of community-based learning, taught by 
Dr. Sherrie Gradin, the Director of Writing. We were involved in the initial 
stages of a partnership with the Juvenile Rights Project, a non-profit advocate for 
juveniles in the Multnomah county courts. The members of 510 were invited to 
create a research protocol for finding out about the literacy experiences of youth 
involved in this program. 
In light of the fact that within the last fifteen years composition has taken a 
decided turn away from quantitative research to qualitative research, we read a 
number of texts that introduced a variety of qualitative methods a..11.d their 
implications. The class, first of all, agreed to do research with juvenile offenders; 
secondly, the class discussed options and voted to create research teams, not only 
because that would aid in triangulation, but also because we wanted to think of 
ourselves as a research community rather than a loose collection of individual 
researchers; finally, the teams decided, through consensus, to choose 
interviewing and critical reflexivity as the two main research tools. Through 
much reading and vigorous discussion we arrived at a particular interview 
protocol we all found workable. 
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Later, however, things unraveled because of the silence around race. Even 
though silence entered on the scene early during the term, it was later, when we 
began our theoretical work around gender, that great tensions emerged and 
resulted in muteness, particularly on the part of the women. We allowed this 
dynamic, I would argue, to entirely displace the problem of race in our research. 
That experience has alerted me to questions around the concept of race (Does 
race influence how we or the youth experience the world? Is racism even still an 
issue?) that I would like to problematize, at least in part, through the framework 
of postmodern theory. 
Therefore, my approach is framed by a critique of Enlightenment philosophy. 
If the sweeping success of the scientific revolution is one of the important 
accomplishments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is certainly 
underwritten by a collateral philosophical enterprise carried from Newton and 
Descartes to Hume, Kant and Hegel. The philosophical concept of pure 
knowledge, liberated from old constraints and superstitions, promoted the idea 
that scientific inquiry is radically separate from the muddy context of social and 
political tensions. The laboratory model becomes perhaps the only locus of true, 
that is, scientific, knowledge is deeply embedded in our cultural assumptions. 
But Immanuel Kant's idea of pure knowledge is permeated with underlying 
ideas of race. In "A Genealogy of Modern Racism" Cornel West traces racist 
thought in major Enlightenment figures. He quotes Kant (Hegel's teacher) who is 
also much influenced by Hume in his "Observations on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and Sublime:" 
although many of [the slaves] have been set free, still not a single one was 
ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other 
praiseworthy quality, even though among the Whites some continually rise 
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aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the 
world. So fundamental is the difference between the two races of man, and 
appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color. (485) 
It strikes me that the predominantly voiced views in our class were not all that 
different from those expressed here by Kant. "If those (fill in the blank) didn't 
have so many children ,they could make it like everybody else," still rings in my 
ears. And those who don't make it, so the implication hovered in the classroom, 
are not naturally suited to higher education in the first place. For an 
Enlightenment thinker this is an entirely rational statement. Thus, we continue 
to think of objectivity as somehow true and, with that, like to believe it to be the 
most distilled form of knowledge that is entirely innocent of, for example, 
economic demands and underlying ideologies. That is why, when our 
underlying assumptions were challenged by the post-modernist qualitative 
research texts, we tended to flee back to the safe universality of Enlightenment 
concepts of science. And when we did consider contextual issues of class, race, 
or gender, we picked gender, the most self-interested one of these normative 
ideas. 
Consequently, those of us who continued to reflect on the class disagreed on 
what was important. I argued that race was the most excluded discussion, and 
that therefore the silencing of women in the class was not the most important 
issue; certainly, it wasn't the only issue. Two other women limited their critiques 
to how we can create a "truly" open classroom in which women could speak. I 
would propose that our silences around race created more crucial issues because 
they helped maintain a sphere of power in which we exercised white privilege 
without acknowledging the power of race or our privilege as White university 
students. Our victimization had its limits. Our collaborative silence in fact 
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helped maintain a sphere of power in which we could exercise white privilege 
without acknowledging the power of race. With that, we reproduced dynamics 
in which we indulged through a kind of gothic exoticism--the Black "offender" 
becomes the deliciously dangerous other--without ever having to risk ourselves. 
In this reproduction of philosophical hierarchies we find the Hegelian concept of 
phenomenology. In Hegel's construction of mind as the ability to reason to an 
ideal state of pure transcending truth, the contextual actuality of embodied 
human experience is altogether irrelevant.4 
Yes, the women were silenced by aggressive and overpowering men in the 
class, but it was a complicit silence. Since we are fairly privileged members of 
the academy, there comes a point where it is our responsibility to not be silent, to 
speak even when speaking is difficult or painful. When I listened to the women 
talk at the end of the term, it seemed as if our being silenced somehow qualified 
us to be members of the oppressed masses. But there are degrees of silence. It 
was much easier to lament the marginalization of women than tackle something 
like Kant's statement that "Many of [the Negroes] have even been set free, still 
not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science"5 
The racial implications of this statement would have become a direct threat to the 
very basis of our liberal ideas of education. Still, Kant's explication of 
fundamental differences among the races is not divorced from his philosophy; in 
fact, it is a widespread nineteenth century attitude as part of a nationalizing 
political agenda that one can find over and over again in the history of ideas. 
Therefore, I would argue that, yes, gender oppression is real, and dynamics in 
the course without a doubt worked to silence women; nonetheless, it is very 
probable that race, particularly if you are Black, Hispanic, or Native American, is 
even more silencing. Further, the silencing of women is not necessarily an 
universal gender problem. In the African American community, according to 
June Jordan in "Don't You Talk About My Mama!" generally speaking, the men 
are the ones who get the dirtier end of the stick, who are even more powerless 
and more silenced than are the women. In that context, then, gender issues may 
well shift. 
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The members of the research class were unwilling to examine the different 
colors of silence. I, on the other hand, seem to be preoccupied with the problem 
of race. This preoccupation is marked by the fact that my life and the life of my 
parents (we are from Berlin, Germany) were shaped by the most significant event 
in recent history, the Holocaust. The overwhelming scope and the implications 
of genocide have left little room for anything else in my historical community. 
Thus, my own intellectual work is largely determined by the study of modes of 
accommodation and resistance to an underlying idealistic philosophy that, aside 
from socio-economical and political factors, made possible the organized, 
technically refined, and emotionally detached extermination of six million Jews. 
With that in mind, and since the inherited wisdom of the parent generation was 
altogether suspect, my generation has spent much time confronting the 
irreconcilable problem of the Holocaust in order to find out what can make 
meaning possible at all. From where I stand, the Holocaust signifies the great 
death of positive progress. This is what many postmodernist thinkers, for 
example, Jacques Derrida, mean when they talk about the death of the father. It 
is the end of logocentric discourse that insists that the law of the father forms the 
center of meaning, including scientific meaning. This absolute displacement of 
reason, in tum, radically questions the Enlightenment idea of progress. How else 
could an extremely educated high culture, on whose philosophy we base much 
of our humanist thought today, engage in and execute the rational of organized 
genocide? 
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While I fear that confronting racism through reflections on the Holocaust may 
tempt me to overstate my point, I would still assert that we have in no way 
overcome the problem of racism.6 Our desire to attribute to the Holocaust a 
historicity that no longer concerns discourse as practice is a problem widely 
discussed by scholars concerned with revisionist Holocaust discourse. I find that 
to be particularly the case here in the US where possibly the "island mentality" of 
this country contributes to that attitude. All the same, I would argue that 
conditions may have improved, but the underlying dialectic of racism continues 
to inhabit the same paradigm as it did fifty years ago.7 Zygmunt Bauman also 
argues that the Holocaust as racism was not an aberration, but a logical 
continuation of modernist principles. In his understanding, the Jewish mass 
murder "was not only the technological achievement of an industrial society, but 
also the organizational achievement of a bureaucratic society" (13).8 Should the 
US American economy fall into a depression, should unemployment rates rise by 
only a few percent, modem racism would be ready to function immediately--
either through armed partisan action and through the technology of the state, or 
both. On a less dramatic level, Cornel West's Race Matters and Edward Said's 
Cultural Imperialism agree that in many subtle ways we continue to support a 
regime of exclusion that finally and in all actuality manifests itself through a 
technology of writing. 
All these reflections, then, play into my ideas around qualitative research as a 
postmodern scientific activity in which we consciously risk inter-subjectivity.9 
So, too, does Donna Haraway's Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the 
World of Modern Science. Haraway, a biologist, outrageously speaks of love, 
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science, and late capitalist economy in the same breath. Like a dancer she moves 
from a rhetoric of conviction to a rhetoric of teasing mockery. She mixes poetry 
with laboratory research, qualitative methodologies with a comedy of self and 
other. I mention Haraway, not only because she is one of the "hard" scientists 
who first opened doors to situated knowledges for women within the academy, 
but also because her fast, wild and brilliant transgressions of discourse 
conventions encourage me to take a more creative approach to science. She adds 
a terministic screen to the ways in which I read the silence around race in English 
510. 
The research community of ENG 510 broke down when we refused to discuss 
race; we fell back on the modernist scientific approach of the laboratory 
principle. "Let's study them objectively," a classmate proposed. Oppositional 
voices, while they protested, were not loud enough. If one considers that the 
majority of the class was White, while the majority of targeted youth was Black, 
this attitude is problematic. After all, we don't see a whole lot of African 
American graduate students of English running around to research the literacy 
needs of White juvenile offenders. Still, the general sentiment in class was that, 
yes, race, class, and gender do play a role, but we have already transcended these 
prejudices because we are enlightened academics; there is no need to discuss 
them in detail. This ideology of progress is itself an exclusionary dynamic that 
enforces the unquestioned privilege we carry within the academy. But: "The 
notion that Black people are human beings is a relatively new discovery in the 
modern West" says Cornel West in "The Genealogy of Modern Racism" (477).10 
Likewise, Bauman argues that racism continues to function today and is, in fact, 
made possible by the very concept of modernity. The voiced consent in the class 
was that "anyone can make it," if he really tries. This universalist approach to 
science, to knowledge creation, and to minority student success, won over 
dissenting voices who preferred silence over confrontation. 
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This paper, then, tells the story of some of these silences. This approach does not 
mean to reduce the intellectual vigor of a critical thesis to dirty relativism; rather, 
this self-reflexive stance is a continuation of the qualitative research we began in 
510. That kind of research includes Harding's ideas of local objectivities, of a 
science of the singular. It attempts the melding of fact, interpretation, and 
imagination. It tells stories about otherwise mute situated knowledges. The idea 
of story-telling, which has a particular genealogy of its own within theory, helps 
to trace otherwise invisible connections and ruptures between the public and 
private discourse of university students and their research "subjects." It also 
acknowledges that the writing is not only a medium to impart findings, but 
writing is here what we (as researchers) look for. In that sense, students can find 
a way to locate themselves within the text they write, not through narcissist 
display of self, but rather as part of a contextual critical framework. "Research," 
says Roland Barthes, "is the name we give to the activity of writing. Whatever it 
searches for, it must not forget its nature as language" (198). 
Yet, science likes to negate the role of its own narrativity. Even as science is 
now undertaking a rigorous analysis of its own inherent biases--and qualitative 
research is part of this self-conscious critique--its practitioners tend to be trapped 
continually within positivist nineteenth-century representative models. In "The 
Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," Hayden White ponders the 
insights narrative can give into the nature of real events? What kind of blindness 
with respect to reality does narrativity dispel? "It will be revealed," says White, 
"that the very distinction between real and imaginary events that is basic to 
modem discussions about hard facts and soft ideas presupposes a notion of 
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reality in which "the true1' is identified as positivist knowledge" (397). But this 
knowledge in tum is "real" only insofar as it realizes itself as discourse through 
narrativity. The experience in ENG 510 did not become real because it occurred 
but because, first, it is remembered and, second, because I now record it through 
writing. 
It was through the "factual" narrativity of an "objective" discipline that 
scientists like Haraway, Harding and Rorty themselves have transformed 
narrativity from objectivist representation into a self-aware paradigm of writing 
as knowledge creation because, to quote Lyotard, "all metanarratives have lost 
their credibility, regardless of what mode of unification they use" (37). With that, 
Lyotard insists on the legitimacy of performative "small" narratives, little 
histories, so to speak, that create multiplicity and hetero-geneity of language. 
Consequently, the creation of knowledge is inseparable from the act of writing. 
All the same, using this particular method in an English Masters thesis is 
problematic because it is a new approach that I undertake, knowing full well that 
we fight not only about the meaning of words; we fight over the words 
themselves. But is there any way that we could discuss method without giving a 
narrative account of the history of objectivity itself, that is, a narration that 
already prejudices the outcome of the story we would tell in favor of, let's say, 
juvenile offenders? 
CHAPTER I 
WHAT IS QUALITATIVE RESEARCH? 
How Privileging Local Objectivities Can Revitalize Composition 
In "Methodological Pluralism" Gesa Kirsch says that the strength of 
qualitative research is its ability to invite new questions, to encourage dialogue 
and inquiry, and to define knowledge making as a continuously changing 
enterprise. uFor composition studies, this kind of research means opening up the 
agenda to subjects, listening to their stories, and allowing them to actively 
participate in the design, development and reporting of research" (257). 
Broadly speaking, qualitative research is different from quantitative research 
in as much as it does not count and measure things in the same way that 
quantitative research does. I don't want to create the impression that we, the 510 
collective, engaged in systematic qualitative research; nonetheless, I wish to 
outline a few specific and important points about the concept. Qualitative 
research is more often than not naturalistic research, meaning, attempts are made 
to study a subject in its own environment. Qualitative research is interested in 
meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and 
descriptions of things. We spent most of our time familiarizing ourselves with 
various theoretical approaches and critiques of strengths and weaknesses of this 
naturalistic research concept. We developed a few semi-formal question clusters, 
and interviewed a limited number of youth at the end of the term. Due to time 
constraints we did not have a chance to carefully evaluate the interviews and 
reflect on them as a group. 
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Qualitative research often uses participant observation as part of its 
methodology. This approach assumes that the observer is never quite outside of 
the situation she observes, but rather, through her very presence, already alters 
the conditions she wants to investigate. According to Berg's Qualitative 
Research Methods for the Social Sciences, many qualitative researchers rely on 
interviews for data collection, That is what we did in moderate measure. 
Another tool the class found useful is "thick description." Using all five senses, 
one writes down as many impressions as one can. More sophisticated qualitative 
researchers experiment with natural settings, they use photographic techniques, 
historiography, textual analyses, sociometry, sociodrama, and similar 
ethnomethodological experimentation, ethnographic research, and other 
unobtrusive techniques. Data is then triangulated to combine several lines of 
sight, with results that are rich in perspectives. Qualitative researchers are most 
interested in "how humans arrange themselves and their settings and how 
inhabitants of these settings make sense of their surroundings through symbols, 
rituals, social structures, social roles, and so forth" (7). Considering our project, 
this seemed like a helpful approach to find out what, for the juvenile offenders 
we were directed to, gives meaning to reality. Generally speaking, then, 
qualitative research, since it is based on a symbolic interactionist perspective, is 
most useful in finding out about the situated knowledges and "local 
objectivities" of any given group. 
I can't say that I am altogether convinced by this concept of research. I am 
hesitant when Berg slides off into a moral discourse of empathy that has a 
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Victorian ring to it. When he speaks about how the researcher should get out of 
a research group at the end of a project, Berg explains, for example, that not only 
the subjects make emotional commitments, "so, too, do many researchers--even 
without going native" (116). He may use irony here, but I doubt it, since the tone 
of the whole text is more pedantic than satiric. Further, I have talked to a 
number of people who have tried to conduct this kind of research with the result 
that they don't want to do it anymore. It feels too intrusive to them, even like an 
act of colonialization, due perhaps to the fact that it is intrusive indeed, even if 
Berg says that the researcher must fully immerse himself into the situation of the 
subject he is researching. But the very presence of the researcher changes the 
"natural" setting of the "subject" to be researched. It is an illusion to think that 
the well-read researcher can transcend certain differences (i.e., I cannot go into a 
Black community and blend in), and somehow become so "unobtrusive" as to 
not alter the "natural" setting of a research subject. Our "research subjects," who 
were not laboratory rats but young people who already live with a deck of cards 
that is stacked against them, tended to be suspicious of our professedly altruistic 
research. And rightfully so: we came, we interviewed, we left.11 We were what 
Berg calls "callous investigators" (116). Since we had initially convinced the 
youths that we were sincerely interested in their interpretation of the world, their 
suspicious attitude is an altogether understandable reaction. 
This dynamic is perhaps the problem with the humanist's will to help. Gesa 
Kirsch insists that we must develop enough critical self-awareness to "reveal that 
all methodologies are culturally situated and inscribed, never disinterested or 
impartial" (248).12 Therefore, we needed to unpack the concept of "helping." 
But the class resisted that discussion. I would propose that the majority of class 
members was motivated to interview juvenile offenders by a gothic desire to 
15 
safely explore the "dangerous other." Admittedly, this is a bold assumption on 
my part that I find difficult to substantiate. All I recall are a number of belittling 
remarks about juvenile offenders, or even teenagers in general, that were 
possible (and went unchallenged) because we could so safely distance ourselves 
from their experience, all the while naming and renaming their presumed 
deviance. "You'd better watch your wallet when you go to talk to that little 
punk," is one comment I remember. A group member who was going to 
interview a youth in lock-up, said: "Well, I hope nobody's gonna knife me when 
I go in there." I suddenly had visions of Wyatt Earp walking unarmed into a 
camp of hostile Indians. 
This level of analysis revealed a certain lack of reflexivity. Words were flying 
back and forth so quickly during class, it was hard to jump, grab on to an 
implication, challenge it, and push it to its limit. Coming from a Marxist 
background, I can only think of qualitative research, certainly in this particular 
context, as an act of solidarity. That is: we have to realize that we are part of a 
collective and interdependent network of power relationships (academic and 
nonacademic) that is not necessarily static but nonetheless privileges certain 
literacies (and the economic rewards that go with that) over others; we need to 
find out if we have any common ground at all, and, if we can find that common 
ground, we can then trace this common ground to create a union of interests. We 
do this not for, but together with, the so-called juvenile offenders. 
But even if qualitative research is an ambiguous and perhaps even embattled 
concept, it allows for reflection and the creation of narrative descriptions of 
research issues, even if that reads strangely. While qualitative research "will not 
necessarily produce a coherent or unified body of knowledge," Gesa Kirsch 
concedes, she also points out that 11it may reveal contradictions, fissures, and 
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gaps in our current knowledge of composition" (248). For Kirsch, qualitative 
research opens up the agenda to subjects, to listening to their stories, and to 
allowing them to actively participate, as much as possible, in the nature of the 
research. The young man I interviewed, for example, reads my drafts and gives 
me his comments and critiques. I also cite him as a source in my bibliography. 
Objectivity with a capital 0 is no longer the issue; neither is total subjectivity. 
Rather, the structure of the research validates the "local objectivity" of the youths 
we spoke to. 
WHY SHOULD WRITING TEACHERS DO QUALITATIVE RESEARCH? 
It May Create Possibilities for Social Meaning and Action 
English education in America is trouble. English education acts as a gatekeeper. 
English education closes down opportunities, especially for minorities and untraditional 
students. 
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English education narrows rather than opens the possibilities of social meaning and social action. 
English education should stop doing this. 
June Jordan in The Violence of Literacy 
In the United States, so the story goes, we live in a society where everybody, 
regardless of class, race, or gender has an equal chance for the pot of gold at the 
end of the rainbow. But the American Dream does not come true for an 
increasingly large segment of the population. Still, it is a powerful metaphor. 
People still think that death and poverty are somehow optional. Likewise, the 
myth of the melting pot is a great lie, told over and over again by those who 
want to protect their positions of power while pacifying the others who are 
implicitly and explicitly excluded from this fairy tale. 
Clearly, academic literacy is central to the ability to influence discourse and, 
with that, to assert political power. At the same time, literacy or lack thereof is 
not the problem; instead, as Elspeth Stuckey argues in The Violence of Literacy, it 
is a manifestation of the problem. As a revisionist Marxist, she sees economy as 
the real problem. Academic literacy is not a noble ideal in and of itself, as Kant 
suggests in his lectures. For Stuckey it is also the technology of the state. She 
sees literacy as the tool used by those who have the power to forge an agenda 
that maintains their privilege as they parcel out disadvantage: ''Literacy itself can 
be understood only in its social and political context." And that context, "once 
the mythology has been stripped away, can be seen as one of entrenched class 
structure in which those who have power have a vested interest in keeping it" 
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(vii). For Stuckey, literacy is what informs the status of a lower class that cannot 
say its name because in the US, so the story goes, we live in a classless society. 
That is why, I would argue, we still have a disproportionate number of racial 
minorities and women in low-prestige jobs, and that is why high-prestige 
professions continue to be overwhelmingly occupied by the traditional class of 
intellectuals for whom literacy remains their domain of supremacy. 
This may sound a bit extreme, but the statistics are chilling. In The End of 
Work (1995), Jeremy Rifkin, an economist who frequently appears on Public 
Television and is thus not weighed down by Marxist theories of production 
modes, argues that we are in the middle of a third industrial revolution that will 
create a vast new urban underclass. In the chapter "Technology and the African-
American Experience," he proposes that technological under-employment has 
fundamentally altered the sociology of America's Black community. Rifkin says 
that "permanent joblessness has led to an escalating crime wave in the streets of 
America's cities and the wholesale disintegration of Black family life." He cites 
various studies: "By the late 1980s one out of every four young African American 
males was either in prison or on probation" (77). This tendency, according to 
Rifkin, will escalate within the next ten years. Similarly, in her 1987 "Don't You 
Talk About My Mama!" June Jordan argues against a New York Times article 
that puts the blame for the disintegration of the Black family with Black women 
and mothers who work to support the family. Jordan points out in no uncertain 
terms that the Black family persists despite the "terrible deteriorating state of 
affairs prevailing in the United States." She asks: "Can anyone truly dare to 
suggest that the catastrophic 46-percent unemployment rate now crippling 
working-age Black men is something that either Black men or Black women find 
desirable?" (196).13 With these statistics in mind, it is clear that the exclusionary 
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violence of academic literacy is not a cause, but rather a manifestation of social 
injustice. I am interested in the stories of so-called juvenile delinquents because I 
think of delinquency as a social construct, meaning that we create delinquency 
like we create poverty or eating disorders, when all the while we have the 
material resources to render these conditions obsolete. 
But back to the problem of literacy research. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed Paulo 
Freire points out that the dominant classes (quantitative and qualitative 
researchers both historically belong to that group) know full well that it is 
dangerous to develop a kind of education "that would enable subordinate classes 
to perceive social injustice critically" (102). But that is exactly what we want to 
do here. We want to create a discursive revision in which race, class, and gender 
are no longer marginalizing factors. If marginal youth could learn to perceive 
social injustice critically, they would certainly be able to shift power networks. 
But this would demand that youth become actively involved in the making of a 
knowledge that is relevant to them as well as to academic discourse. 
Our dilemma as writing teachers is that we can't directly change economic 
conditions. But we can change exclusionary dynamics by recreating academic 
discourse to allow the local objectivity of cultural literacies, while actively 
training historically excluded students to master the traditional tools of the trade. 
We need minorities with degrees. Otherwise, our idea of a multi-cultural 
curriculum will continue to be nothing but a colorful cocktail of folklorist 
subjectivities that maintains exclusionary practices while claiming progress. We 
need more than a few token minority students who get to share their cultural 
particularities in class. The United Scholars of Bennetton is not the idea of an 
education we strive for. We need highly trained minorities who graduate from 
university knowing how to master the technologies of power. The nexus of race, 
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class, gender, and writing as technology of power is where we as writing 
teachers live, and that is why I find this research full of possibilities. My notes 
then serve to reflect on our collective blunders. One of these blunders is that we 
continually fell back on familiar old historicist ideas of science as objective and 
disinterested key to human progress. "If they just tried hard enough, they could 
get a degree, too." There's that good old American story again. 
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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE QUESTION 
Qualitative Research as a Science of Solidarity 
To a degree, I would argue, the division between the sciences and the 
humanities as possessing distinctly separate methodologies only works on a 
surface level. If we were to ask a nineteenth century German philologist like 
Nietzsche, for example, if he thought he were engaging in a scientific activity, he 
would have answered, "of course. What else could it be?"14 Therefore, on a 
deeper level it becomes difficult to trace inherent differences between the 
sciences and the humanities. One can trace this faith in the promise of scientific 
certainty through our reactions as composition researchers. Like many scholars 
in any discipline, our notion of science as rational and objective analysis arises 
out of nineteenth century positivist philosophy. 
Allow me to expand a bit on the idea. Darwin, Marx and Comte are 
philosophers of science who refer back to earlier natural philosophers like 
Newton, Kant, or Descartes. They all develop theories on rational analysis as the 
highest form of knowledge that transcends human context. These ideas have and 
continue to permeate our own style of thinking around science to a degree we 
may not even be entirely aware of. As the founder of positivism, Auguste Comte 
(1798-1857) diligently carries on the Cartesian project with a lasting effect. He 
offers a coherent set of explanations of the development of human consciousness 
that is well situated within the tradition of nineteenth century grand and 
universal theories. For Comte, so Lucien Goldmann points out, human 
consciousness progresses through three stages: (1) religious consciousness, (2) 
metaphysical consciousness, and (3) scientific consciousness. Some cultures have 
progressed further than others; that is why, for Comte, we have "primitive" and 
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"highly developed" cultures. To explain this dialectic, he uses the great 
nineteenth century metaphor of infancy, maturation and adulthood that emerges 
out of Rousseau's earlier ideas of the social contract. 
But Comte's theories are well in concert with other powerfully emerging 
Enlightenment ideas. In 1828, Hegel, for example, gives a lecture on the history 
of unfolding consciousness in Berlin. For Hegel, the goal of history is to fully 
actualize freedom. Interestingly enough, in his lecture at the Free University he 
argues that freedom arises in the Orient.15 For Hegel, the Orient is everything 
that is not European. He doesn't bother with differentiations--it's all East. 
Classical Greco-Roman culture will expand on this idea. Then, for Hegel, the 
next stage is, not surprisingly, German Christian culture. In the Prussian state all 
citizens are free. Again the darker races are portrayed as being in a "natural" 
state of cultural "infancy," while the central European peoples have "matured" to 
the full actualization of freedom. You notice how powerfully this metaphor 
functions as an ideology and, by implication, also supports a philosophy of 
racial superiority. 
In his "Genealogy of Modem Racism" Cornel West refers to this point by 
citing Jefferson's "Notes on Virginia" in which Jefferson meditates on "natural" 
race differences: 
Comparing them by their faculties of memory, reason, and imagination, it 
appears to me, that in memory they are equal to Whites; in reason much 
inferior and that in imagination they are dull, tasteless and anomalous. 
Never yet could I find that a Black had uttered a thought above the level of 
plain narration; never see even an elementary trait of painting or sculpture. 
(485) 
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Clearly, in the mind of Jefferson and other Enlightenment thinkers, the ''Negro" 
appears to be stuck in the infancy of human development. For Kant there is an 
inherent hierarchical difference in intellectual capacity among the races; for 
Jefferson, Blacks are likewise naturally inferior. In his mind, their "childlike" 
reason is not as well developed as in the "adult" White race.16 But 
Enlightenment thinkers have nothing against children; they just propose we do 
for them what they can't do for themselves because of an inherent lack of ability. 
If one keeps the infancy metaphor in mind, this rational positioning of racist 
hierarchies works rather well. I would even go so far as to suggest that we 
produce "teenagerdom" (as an American mainstream concept) along the same 
lines through which we produce a kind of adolescent deviance that we then 
culturally posit as natural. 
Qualitative research actively works against the universalist assumptions of 
positivist philosophy of science. It consciously privileges the partial perspective 
by creating knowledge about cultural literacies. It is a contextual and subjective 
method; yet, it is also a scientific activity. And, while it does not mean to replace 
quantitative research, it offers possibilities for local objectivities and situated that 
are for our purposes more useful than the methods of quantitative research. It 
creates oral histories that have historically been excluded from academic 
discourse, and it can weave a more substantive picture of contextual 
understanding of the influence race, gender, and class have on a particular 
group. 
With that, we once again come up against the problem of objectivity. 
Qualitative research makes no claims to objectivity. But, culturally speaking, we 
tend to think of an objective fact as something that is discovered, not made or 
constructed--the structure of DNA, for example. But the etymology of facts 
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refers us to human action, performance, indeed, to human feats (OED). Deeds, as 
opposed to words, are the parents of facts. That is, human action is at the root of 
what we can see as fact, linguistically and historically. A fact is the thing done, 
"a neuter past participle in our Roman parent language," Donna Haraway 
proposes in Primate Visions (3). In that etymological sense, then, facts are what 
has actually happened. Such things are known by direct experience, by 
testimony, by interrogation--lately privileged routes to knowledge. With that, 
facts become words, become "true" through language alone, particularly through 
. 1 17 written anguage. 
In our culture, the notions of "science," "rationality," "objectivity," and "truth" 
are all related to one another. We think of science as offering "hard," "objective" 
truth--the truth that most corresponds with reality, the only truth that is worthy 
of that name anymore. Humanists like us, that is, philosophers, historians, 
literary types, and composition teachers, have to worry about whether we are 
"scientific"--whether we are entitled to think of our conclusions, no matter how 
carefully we argue them, as worthy of the term "true." We tend to think that 
"objective truth" can only be found by using "reason," and so we think of 
rationality as a matter of following procedures laid down in advance, of being 
"methodical." So we then use "methodical," "rational," "scientific," and "objective" 
as synonyms. 
In Richard Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth there is a chapter titled 
"Science as Solidarity." Here, Rorty suggests that this worrying about 
"objectivity" is characteristic of a secularized culture in which the scientist 
replaces the priest. He is the "one" who keeps humanity in touch with something 
beyond itself. But, Rorty goes on, the distinctions between hard facts and soft 
values, truth and pleasure, and objectivity and subjectivity are awkward and 
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clumsy instruments. Not only do they belong to 19th century philosophy, they 
also create more problems than they solve. He proposes to recreate the sciences, 
starting with a new vocabulary. He makes another point I find very useful, 
especially since anti-scientific sentiments are a bit chic among the literati: "It is 
not a question of debunking or downgrading the ... scientist, but simply of 
ceasing to see him as a priest" (39). 
Donna Haraway, a biologist at the University of California, Santa Cruz 
(formerly at Johns Hopkins), makes a similar point in "Situated Knowledges: The 
Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective." She 
proposes that for too long we have both selectively used and been trapped by 
two poles of a tempting dichotomy in the question of objectivity. It is time, she 
says, that we once and for all put the curious term "objectivity" to rest. Recent 
social studies of science and technology have made available a very strong social 
constructionist argument "for all forms of knowledge claims, most certainly and 
especially scientific ones" (576) (her emphasis). Within this theory, no insider's 
perspective is privileged, because all drawings of inside-outside boundaries in 
knowledge are theorized as power moves, not moves toward truth. Why then, 
Haraway asks, should we be cowed by science? "They tell parables about 
objectivity and scientific method to students in the first years of their initiation, 
but no practitioner of the high scientific arts would be caught dead acting on the 
textbook versions" (576). She becomes even more explicit: "no practitioner of the 
high scientific arts would be caught dead acting on the textbook versions" 576). 
Apparently, scientists know that their knowledge creation is as much an art as it 
is a science, and their practice acknowledges the contextuality of their work, 
Haraway reflects. 
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Consequently, in relationship to qualitative research we would do well to keep in 
mind the parable of objectivity when we argue universals to devalue situated 
knowledges. Paulo Freire says that it is high time educators move beyond the 
desire for lily-white objectivity. Inevitably, he suggests, educators come to a 
point where they either educate for oppression or for liberation. We as 
qualitative researchers must remember what it means for us to deny that 
knowledge is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to the world. If we 
agree that the world does not exist as a reality apart from us, that means our 
actions work to either liberate or oppress the subjects of our work. If we 
remember that, it won't be so easy to blink away our collaboration with 
exclusionary literacy practices so easily. To think of qualitative research as a 
science of solidarity makes it imperative to have a clear understanding of 
underlying theoretical bases. And since there is no practice that is somehow 
innocent of theory, sometimes theory is the most practical thing to do. 
CHAPTER II 
THE POLEMICS OF STEPHEN NORTH AS METHOD 
58. Only as Creators: --This has given me the greatest trouble 
and still does: to understand that what things are called is 
incomparably more important than what they really are. The 
reputation, name, and appearance, the usual measure and 
weight of a thing, what it counts for--originally almost always an 
error and an arbitrary decision, thrown over things like a dress 
and altogether strange and foreign to their nature and even to 
their skin--all this grows from generation unto generation, 
simply because we believe in it, until it gradually grows into the 
thing itself and acts as if it were its very body. What at first was 
appearance becomes in the end, almost invariably, the essence 
and operates as such. Only a fool would think that it is enough 
to reveal this origin, this foggy shroud of insanity, in order to 
destroy that "essential" world, this so-called "Reality." 
We may destroy only as creators. But let us not forget this either: 
it is enough to create new names and estimations and 
probabilities in order to create in the long run new "things." 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Book II 
Members of ENG 510 were not enchanted with Stephen North's The Making of 
Knowledge in Composition: Portrait of an Emerging Field. I, on the other hand, rather 
liked it because I saw connections to a Nietzschean methodology. The above 
quotation from The Gay Science is one of Nietzsche's theoretical basis statements. 
Many postmodern thinkers use it as a point of departure. North is very much a 
Nietzschean scholar. The similarity in not only method but style is apparent in 
North's piece on the idea of the writing center, that caused great dissent in our 
PSU Writing Center. By Nietzschean I mean not only the provocative 
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argumentation, but North builds directly on Nietzsche's dictum that we may 
destroy only if we are willing to create something new. In The Making of 
Knowledge in Composition, North uses a polemic style that tends to irritate readers. 
But, and this is the purpose of his rhetoric, his readers start discussing. He 
forced us to question underlying assumptions. I have included the above 
aphorism because it speaks directly to that issue. It sketches Nietzsche's critique 
of science as the (pure) will to truth. Further, this aphorism is a central 
methodological statement for Nietzsche's later departure from idealist thought. 
That also makes it the point of departure for much of postmodern theory. 
Foucault, for example, took off with it to write The Order of Things, Derrida's_Of 
Grammatology derives much of its argumentation out of Nietzsche, Jameson's 
critique of orthodox Marxist dialectic materialism also connects to Nietzsche's 
critique of philosophy. Further, Gallop's Thinking Through the Body plays with the 
hidden epistemological assumptions that Nietzsche has tickled out for us. 
Likewise, Nietzsche's groundwork has allowed for Harding's feminist critique of 
the scientific project. Any postmodernist worth her salt should be familiar with 
the genealogy of these theories. 
A few words about the polemic style: in my understanding a polemic is a 
controversial argument, particularly in the sense that it means to refute a 
reigning doctrine that is deeply embedded in any given body of cultural 
knowledge. In Nietzsche's understanding, we, as a culture, desperately hang on 
to the concept of positivist science with its replicable quantitative research 
method that we have named "Truth," even if this truth is nothing more than an 
"arbitrary decision," that is "thrown over things like a dress." That is why, for 
Nietzsche, and for North in this case, the provocative faculty of a polemics is in 
order. In light of that, North has accomplished that people passionately argue 
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over the assumptions of their field. That is, if nothing else, worth the risk he took 
in upsetting his discourse community. 
Further, North's title The Making of Knowledge in Composition is a Nietzschean 
wordplay in several ways. For one thing, it directly follows Nietzsche's 
suggestion that we may destroy only if we create something new, because "only a 
fool would think that it is enough to reveal this origin, this foggy shroud of 
insanity, in order to destroy this so-called reality." North takes a hard look a 
what we are told Composition is, outlines the shape of the body of 
"current/traditional" knowledge, and discovers its narrow limits (118). At the 
end of his argument he admits that in many ways his style is "raw, rough and 
ready, and polemical, very much of a piece with the sometimes comic 
scrambling" (374). 
North's "comic scrambling" is part of his self-conscious critique of the 
epistemology of Composition research. Additionally, North's use of "knowledge 
creation" in the title of his book plays on the German word for science. In 
German, Wissenschaft means "science", but at he same time the word's literal 
meaning is "knowledge creation." This etymology is what Nietzsche plays with 
in the title of aphorism 58, "Only as Creators." He really asks why it is so much 
more important to rely on what things are called than "what they really are." 
The arbitrary naming of a thing grows from generation to generation, simply 
because we believe in it. The crucial part of his argument is his statement that 
only a fool would believe it is enough to point out, that is, to deconstruct, the 
erroneous nature of Enlightenment truth claims for reality. "We may destroy 
only as creators," he insists. At that level of reading, then, the term Wissenschaft 
as knowledge creation can no longer be clearly distinguished from the creation 
of, say, a sculpture, a piece of music, or even a novel. With that, Nietzsche 
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seduces the name of rationalist science with its claims to transcendent truth, into 
a relationship with aesthetics and the fine arts, that are in German called the 
"creative arts." 
Stephen North likes to talk about discourse as "lore." The idea of scientific 
knowledge as a story, even a fairy tale, also leans on Nietzsche's critique of 
positivism. In "On Truth and Lying in an Extramoral Sense," Nietzsche describes 
"truth" as an "army of mobile metaphors." He argues the continental claim for a 
genealogical heritage originating in the superior Classical Greco-Roman 
tradition, particularly in Aristotelian theories of ratio, is an illusion. The will of 
the West for pure knowledge is, for Nietzsche, never a disinterested enterprise. 
On the contrary, the will for knowledge is always the will for power, discursive 
power, if you will.18 Similarly, North proposes: "just what that term [revolution] 
means--who revolted against whom (or what), why, and to what effect--depends 
on who is telling the story" (318). In that sense, the question is not so much "is 
the story true?", but the more interesting question is, "who gets to tell the story 
and under what circumstances?" 
With his methodological moves Nietzsche provides the tools to strip words of 
their reputations, names, and appearances. Now they weigh differently; they 
have different shapes. The idea, for example, that objectivity is a kind of 
intersubjectivity, creates possibilities by giving words new names, new 
estimation, and new probabilities. Who would have spoken of "local 
objectivities" twenty years ago? If for Nietzsche scientific truth in all of its 
natural ontology--take Kant's assertion that the "Negro race" is naturally inferior 
to the White race, or even the concept of race itself--is nothing but an army of 
mobile metaphors, then for Nietzsche, science is the great autobiographical 
metaphor of the West with which it claims its ownership of truth. In Thus Spoke 
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Zarathustra, he has an extended aphorism called "On the Thousand and One 
Goals." This title refers, if you recall, to the stories of_A Thousand and One Arabian 
Nights, in which Sheherazade invents a new tale every night to tell the cruel 
Sultan in order to save her life and that of her family. Nietzsche points out that 
we, that is, the nineteenth century western tradition, are no different from 
Sheherazade: to survive, we tell one story after another. We place values on 
certain things, we posit goals, we give meaning to things that may be radically 
different in nature. But to save our lives we keep telling stories. The irony is that 
"Verily, men gave themselves all their good and evil" ( 48). It is in that sense, I 
think, that North uses the terms "lore" and 1'story." It is a "less-than-serious," or 
·perhaps "more-than-serious" approach to the history of knowledge and the 
creation of more. That again goes hand in hand with Jbe Gay Science. For 
Nietzsche the idea of a gay, joyous, and playful science opposes the tragic 
German idealist view of science he finds in Hegel. But Hegel's and Kant's 
idealist beliefs in the science project were not disinterested. They were 
embedded in the larger task to form a cultural identity that would support the 
formation of the German nation-state.19 
In this paradigm laughter is always suspect, even subversive. Nietzsche 
invokes laughter because it carries this image of the selfcreated genealogy of the 
west beyond the oppositional deadlock. The whole dialectic does have a comic 
aspect to it. All the same, this philosophical heritage likes to view itself as the 
embodiment of gravitas, tragic reason, as the noblest form of knowledge. I 
mention all this because the creation of the German research universities has so 
very strongly influenced the development of American research universities. 
North is very much aware of the subversive potential of laughter. His polemic is 
similar to Nietzsche's because like Nietzsche, he demands a self-conscious 
critique of the genealogy of science that goes beyond just another "rational" 
opposition. Therefore, North's mischievous provocations are meant to cause 
discomfort in practitioners of old historicist science (like 510, for example) 
without the usual threat of annihilation. 
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North's mischievious provocations are directed against the positivist stance 
that quantitative researchers in composition have cultivated over the last twenty 
years, and that we, qualitative researchers though we are, have unthinkingly 
adopted. Through his provocations he tries to destroy the old will to power that 
likes to disguise itself as a quest for universalist truth. Instead he wants to tease 
out a desire for less aggressive knowledges. His taste for irony builds a vital and 
creative--even in an artistic sense--space for forceful possibilities in which, as 
North himself insinuates, "anything can happen" (375). His polemic works, I 
think, because it can shake Enlightenment thinkers of composition and their 
critics out of an inherited despotic style of thought that traps them in the 
questioning of limits and powers it has abused. But the transcendental Self of 
510 felt threatened to the core. North challenged our most dearly (and secretly) 
held beliefs in the revealing truth of grand narratives. His polemic, though, is 
not meant to viciously destroy, but to provoke composition researchers into 
becoming conscious of the actual possibilities and freedoms to which we can 
have access. With that, North's preposterous ironies are part of a postmodern 
methodology that does not want to be serious all the time but have a bit of fun as 
well. This desire, though, is often not well received by Enlightenment thinkers 
who live through the earnest, even priest-like, responsibility of their search for 
truth. And, as English 510 demonstrated, one can never overestimate the 
importance of being earnest. 
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REFLECTIONS ON THE CLASS 
The Public and Private Discourses of Students in ENG 510 
White supremacy allows those who exercise white 
privilege not to acknowledge the power of race, to behave 
as though race does not matter, even as they help put in 
place and maintain spheres of power where racial 
hierarchies are fixed and absolute. 
bell hooks 
The following section contains a narrative account that Cliffort Geertz calls 
thick description. With that, it is one of the qualitative research methods I use. 
The reflections below are therefore a self-consciously subjective contribution that 
seeks to trace ruptures and connections between the public and private 
discourses of ENG 510 which were not put in words while we were in class. 
They are not meant to be interpreted as an idealizing heuristic model of thought. 
Instead, to speak with Berg, they are a "subjective soaking" in cultural elements 
(including perceptions) that would otherwise remain opaque (87). 
ENG 510 was a frustrating experience for most of us. It was also a class in 
which I learned a great deal. I felt continually belittled by some of the other 
students. Still, although I am sensitive to issues around gender, and am usually 
fairly outspoken about them, I also let the muteness around gender displace our 
silences regarding race and class. At times my feelings of anger and impotence 
were so overwhelming that I wanted to leave. Several people did leave, I 
remember. There was quite a lot of tension in the class for several weeks. Some 
students said they wanted more guidance from Dr. Gradin. I, on the other hand, 
was indignant at our own passivity and our own unwillingness to refute racist or 
sexist comments that made continued aggression possible. Dr. Gradin did as 
much as possible to channel brutal conflicts into productive waters of communal 
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responsibility; still, among the graduate students the desire for critical inquiry 
was by far outweighed by our somewhat adolescent desire for the authority of a 
traditional classroom. A retreat to the traditional was impossible, however; the 
connection to the community-based aspect of the course had so shifted 
boundaries that the traditional classrom was literally erased. 
The silences around gender, class, and especially race, as part of the class 
dynamics ran parallel to those in our research. Our class interactions became 
more strained with pregnant silences; likewise, our theory discussions became 
dismissive of the influence race has on our impact as researchers on subjects. 
But, as bell hooks says, if we--particularly in this overwhelmingly Anglo 
seminar--are silent about issues of race, gender, and class, we help put in place 
and maintain these very same structures of oppression and exclusion that we 
proposed to have transcended through our awareness of things. That is an 
important fact those of us who continue this work need to keep in mind. The 
shift in authorial power that Dr. Gradin was hoping for went hand in hand with 
the collective intellectual responsibility qualitative research demands. But 
collectively we were so starved for the safe dialectic of a teacher-centered 
classroom that we could not make the leap to a practical awareness of mutual 
interdependency. This is another problem that most probably will resurface in 
the next class that works on the literacy project. 
While during class an increasing number of us cloaked ourselves with silence, 
after class, we, especially the women, would talk about our frustrations. While 
that was helpful, our discourse did not move into the class sessions where they 
really belonged if, that is, self-reflexivity continued to be a mutual goal. We 
remained in what I dubbed "gossip land," home of the discursively less than 
powerful. Even our belated e-mail conversation around issues of aggression 
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were little more than locker room gossip, since the main objects of our gripes, the 
two men in the class who aggressively dominated discussions, were not a part of 
that discussion. They could have participated, of course, but they didn't. At this 
point, many of our important research principles, such as self-reflexivity, 
relevance to subjects, our own agendas as participant-observers, were 
irretrievably lost. All that is left is reflection. 
This class that was intended to be student-centered and thereby, as one of my 
classmates liked to put it, "warm and fuzzy," turned out to be one of the most 
violent experiences I have had at this university. By violent I mean a kind of 
intellectual cruelty to which the body reacts as if to a physical attack. With that in 
mind, the question forced itself on the trapped participants: "what do you do in a 
'warm and fuzzy' class when you have aggressors in there who violently 
dominate and usurp time and space?" While we were still in class, towards the 
end of the term, one of the other students told me he was not going to write 
down all of his critiques of class dynamics in his reflections: "I don't care about 
inquiry anymore. I'll just say a bunch of pleasant things. I just want to survive 
this class." Survival seems like a rather strong term, but actually the tensions 
were almost unbearably high. So, perhaps the idea of survival was not only one 
of those self-indulgent exaggerations that come all too easily to us academics. In 
that context I talked to Jo Buffalo Boy, a Native American drug and alcohol 
counselor who also regularly holds "cultural awareness" workshops, about the 
class dynamics around race. Her comment: "sometimes academics have the 
whole world on the tip of their tongue but they can't tell their ass from a hole in 
the ground." A bit too colorful for academic discourse, perhaps, but her 
bitterness about unacknowledged white privilege is not untypical. Most people 
of color who read my thesis draft reacted with similar cynicism; one African 
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American student, an English major, stated that she doesn't even bother anymore 
to try to discuss underlying ethnocentric classroom dynamics. She spends most 
of her time trying to gamer enough energy to just do her school work. She and 
another African American student asked me not to mention their names in my 
reflections because they do not want to be singled out to represent their race in 
another enlightenment session for Whites "so that they (Caucasians) can feel 
better about themselves." 
Inevitably, levels of stress and aggression in the class began to rise. After class 
I was emotionally, even physically, very exhausted. Others in the class had 
similar reactions, I found out later. At one point, then, I decided to pay attention 
to my physical reactions to the invisible daggers that were flying through the 
class. The body language of one of the men was signaling danger. Frequently, 
just listening to him, my stomach would lurch with fear. My research partner 
described the same reaction: "I spend the evening (after class) getting rid of that 
knot in my stomach." In class, she had taken to intensive doodling. I took to 
turning physically away from the flight path of cutting remarks. My body was 
constantly on guard. I was even prepared for a physical attack. That sounds a bit 
hysterical, one might think, but it turned out later that the man actually was in 
need of clinical help. In any case, whether or not any of us was actually in 
physical danger, the fact remains that our responses were visceral and somatic, 
thus adding to the deafening silence in our learning community. I don't want to 
overemphasize this particular class dynamic, since it was a rather unusual 
situation that did serve to increase tensions. These dynamics were not 
responsible, however, for creating problems that were already manifest. 
The problem of silences began early in the term. I remember one situation in 
which were still formulating possible approaches to, and questions for, the 
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juveniles. I said, "I should e-mail my daughter because at this point she knows 
more about juvenile delinquents than I do." Following that, one man 
commented, "Ah, better watch out. You'll be a grandma real soon." It took me a 
moment to understand what he was insinuating. Then I realized that my 
comment led him to think my daughter hangs out on the seedier side of the 
tracks where young chicks put out for a drink of Thunderbird. What I had meant 
to say was that I used to be a social worker in a youth project in Berlin and used 
to be on good speaking terms with inner city youth, but that was many years 
ago. My daughter, on the other hand, is involved with a program through her 
university that aims at getting youth off the street into a less self-destructive 
environment. I had the urge to explain that my daughter is not about to get 
pregnant because she knows how to take care of herself and, aside from that, her 
body is her business and not my class mate's. And then I wanted to say that I 
resented the implication that my daughter sleeps around, or does what American 
teenagers are meant to do to fulfill the contemptuous expectations of 
condescending adults. 
And I wanted to explain further that Jessica is bright, intellectually curious, 
graduated as Valedictorian from a Jesuit highschool, and that she won a twenty-
thousand dollar scholarship to a private Liberal Arts college in Wisconsin that 
she finds radically alienating in relation to her own cultural experience. Then I 
wanted to take the man who made this remark, shake him, and ask him why he 
thinks he can make such insulting remarks about my daughter who is fighting 
for her life in an academic enivronment that is just as self-servingly stupid as he 
is. But I didn't say anything. I just sat there like a fool and thought all those 
thoughts. 
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I am not sure why I felt it would be useless to expose underlying assumptions. 
Some of the students in class continuously made derogatory remarks that put 
down a lot of people, especially youth. I remember phrases like: "Watch out 
they don't pick your pockets," or, "Well, we all know what those kids are like." 
Partly, I didn't think I had to respond to these insinuations because that would 
put me into a defensive position, and, secondly, I couldn't see why in the world I 
should even have to defend my daughter's ... morality? In our class people 
didn't listen to each other very well. Since derogatory remarks went 
unchallenged most of the time, they continued to hover over discussions like bad 
air. I remember thinking that if I were a young Black man sitting this class, class 
dynamics might have been different. 
All the same, I did e-mail Jessica about formulating questions. She replied 
that in her experience "the biggest tum offs for youth are, of course, someone 
aimlessly trying to help them and maybe feeling like a statistic." She was 
alluding to what Berg called inconsiderate researchers. She added, "it seems 
basic to me but you may ask something like, "If you could make another person 
feel exactly what you do, what would you say? "Jessica mentioned further that 
she knows "a whole lot of people who have a whole lot to say but don't know 
how to go about it really, even in speaking." She finished with: "I don't know. 
You're in a pretty awkward situation." From her point of view, then, the key is 
once again to make sure that our questions, our interests, are relevant to the 
youths we interviewed. 
In our class I was, to my own surprise, one of the people who had a whole lot 
to say but didn't know how to go about it anymore. In later discussions, many of 
us said we had felt a horrible loneliness, intellectual and personal, in the class. 
Were we a community? We were a learning and research community by virtue 
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of our collective task; at the same time, we were utterly incapable of acting with 
any degree of collective responsibility. At one point I wanted to mention that I 
spent time at a youth detention facility. It was called a Reform School, but 
mainly served to contain angry youth. I decided to keep quiet, though, because I 
suddenly realized that this kind of self-revelation would set me apart in an 
undesirable way, or, worse, make me a subject of scientific investigation executed 
by people I didn't trust. Again, the public silences and private discourses found 
no common ground in the seminar. These ruptures between discourses occurred 
frequently. During week four of the term, two men were hogging the discussion 
again. They were talking to each other about what one of the women in class had 
said, all the while ignoring her. Noticing this, I wrote her a note that read: "Why 
aren't we challenging this crap? I feel like psycho-bitch from hell." My classmate 
wrote back: "I'm following Dr. Gradin's cue. Maybe I should be more 
aggressive." We listened some more. I wrote again: "Did X just call you a kid or 
am I getting altogether paranoid?" Her answer: "Yes. One alpha-male told me I 
have a control problem, the other called me a kid. Like my grandmother used to 
say: Fuck them." Clearly, there was a great rift for us between the public and 
private discourses, and any claims to unity of theory and praxis went down the 
drain very quickly. At times, the discussion became so ludicrous that any 
participation seemed entirely pointless. 
Like most of the others I had also dissociated from the goings on and decided 
instead to pass around a quote from Chiseri-Strater's book: 
Male students need to listen and hear what their female classmates have to 
say rather than interrupt and dominate discussions. Women students need 
to hear their own voices raising questions and confronting issues. And 
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women's silences need not always be interpreted as unarticulated knowing 
but as thoughtful reflection and productive meditation. (148) 
Even though my passing this quote around was meant as a cheaply subversive 
revenge against dominating speakers-and it did cause some conspirational 
snickering among the silent--! did not hear my own voice raising questions and 
confronting issues. My silence was not a "thoughtful reflection." But even one 
of the men in class, who by now was increasingly suspicious of things feminist, 
could relate to the quote. He was silenced, too. Every once in a while he made 
an effort to refute some blatantly sexist remark like, "if the minority students 
didn't have so damn many kids they could make it through school like 
everybody else!" by commenting something to the effect that this didn't seem like 
a very reasonable argument. Some of the women though, especially those who 
were raising children, were so angry that we couldn't speak. 
This thick description of class dynamics seems useful because it transforms 
the opaque nature of interlocking classroom dynamics into a readable narration. 
It lifts the gossip, that is, the private discourse of students in ENG 510 into a 
public academic discourse that means to be self-reflexive. Further, it illustrates 
how we became so enamored with our marginality that, not unlike juvenile 
offenders, we began cultivating a sub-community that protested oppressive 
dynamics by becoming silent in a rather loud way. The examples also show how 
we allowed these tensions to entirely displace the problem of race and class. Our 
research lives became lost in the increasingly self-centered and competitive 
atmosphere of the class. In Academic Literacies, Elizabeth Chisery-Strater makes a 
similar point about the rift between the public and private discourses of 
university students. In her understanding "this artificial form of individualism is 
ultimately the loss of themselves as individuals" (x). Likewise, I would say that 
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our 'subversive' personalities ultimately lead to the loss of ourselves as articulate, 
reflective thinkers and researchers. Our use of language served either to engage 
in "bilateral" exchanges with the professor, or we used language as a weapon 
against each other rather than as a tool for constructed understanding. While we 
became, as Chisery-Strater defines it, verbally aggressive, we did not become 
intellectually aggressive (148). If one keeps in mind that one of our qualitative 
research objectives was self-reflexivity (to help us trace the situated knowledges 
and local objectivities of our own context, and how our underlying assumptions 
in turn informed our research bases), it becomes quite obvious that our research 
assumptions had some serious problems. If the silencing of gender issues in a 
class full of discursively privileged university students could cause such an 
onslaught of anger and pain, what would our silences around race and class do 
to youth we were to interview? 
In addition to that, the above narration makes clear that the class collective 
was not able to adequately address any of the contextual issues of race, class, 
gender, in our classroom alone. How could we possibly assume that, because we 
are so conscious of such matters (as several students had stated in class), we 
might somehow transcend them? We did not transcend anything. Reality hit us 
_like a ton of bricks. The Comptian ratio is not pure mind thinking universally; it 
does not stand outside the contextual experience of the social body. On the 
contrary, if we take qualitative research seriously, and if we have a degree of 
critical awareness of the problems faced by the youths we interact with, our 
conscious reason may not treat our research subjects as if they were toys in a 
phenomenological play pen, or the subjects of a laboratory experiment. For the 
youth, the experience is real. It may be a confusing experience for them because 
we, the researchers, never clearly revealed our relationship to the young people 
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we interviewed, and because our questions were perhaps not as relevant to the 
subject's experience as might be desirable, but, no matter how we look at it, our 
theory and practice in and outside the classroom are real. 
REFLECTIONS ON METHOD 
Situated Knowledges and Local Objectivities 
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Qualitative research acknowledges context. It does not only acknowledge 
context as an aside, it insists that context itself shapes the making of knowledge. 
In "Feminism and Methodology in Composition Studies," Patricia Sullivan 
points out that not only the race, class, culture, and gender of the "research 
subject" are important considerations, but that the researcher herself must 
critically reflect on her own cultural, racial, and class assumptions that are never 
neutral and always "determine how and what the researcher sees'' (Methods 36). 
Therefore, I have tried to keep Harding's principles in mind: (1) the 
researcher's relation to the subject of her work is not neutral; (2) the purpose of 
the researcher's questions must be grounded in youth's experience and be 
relevant to them; (3) the researcher's agenda is not disinterested (Methods 256). It 
is important, then, that we as researchers confront our own biases by reflecting 
our own subjective reasons for this research. I find this research useful because, 
as I already said, I spent time in reform school and have since then spent a great 
deal of energy on not reflecting about how this experience relates to my current 
academic work. Still, to date, I am the only one (except my daughter) in my 
family who even earned a high school degree. 
The point is that, as a culture, we produce juvenile offenders like we produce 
homelessness or eating disorders. With that I mean to argue against the myth 
that the state wants to liberate youth from criminalization. Instead I propose that 
we collectively produce more and more deviancy through increasingly intricate 
levels of administration. For support of this theory I refer the reader back to 
Michel Foucault's crucial methodological move in The History of Sexuality, where 
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in part one, "We Other Victorians," he argues against the "repressive hypothesis" 
which asserts that we now have freed ourselves from the repression of the 
"imperial prude." Rather, he says, we have taken Victorian restrain, its 
muteness, and its hypocrisy, and we have refined and extrapolated it to every 
imaginable level of discourse. He, of course, speaks of sexuality, but his work 
rhetorically invites the reader to put other areas of culturally normalizing 
activities in its place. Similarly, I would argue that we have refined silence and 
restrain around race, precisely because we keep repeating that we have freed 
minority groups from the shackles of their repression. Their continued muteness 
is our continued assertion that it is no longer necessary to discuss racism as a 
normal economic regime. 
For instance, I know a five-year-old Hispanic foster child who has a record of 
sexual molestation because he and a Caucasian girl of the same age were fow1d 
"playing doctor." I used to think of that as a normal expression of children's 
sexuality. But today we administer a delinquency that was unthought of twenty 
years ago. It is as if Freud never happened. Both the boy and the girl are now in 
counseling. He never spends a moment unobserved. I doubt that he or she will 
in the future be able to think of themselves in a way that does not include an 
ontology of sexual deviance. Now that he has a record, the boy is increasingly 
difficult to place with foster parents. He is "a runner." When he doesn't run, he 
is screened for "all and any petty offenses, minor indecencies, insignificant 
perversions" ( Foucault 30). 
Regarding the production of deviance, Foucault points to society's gothic 
desire to study The Other. In the context of the 510 class, the "dangerous and 
endangered adolescents" now become the focus of social control. "Under-taking 
to protect, separate, and forewarn, signaling perils everywhere, awakening 
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people's attention, calling for diagnoses, piling up reports, organizing therapies," 
the state produces adolescent offenders on every discursive level (31).20 
Recalling Bauman and Stuckey, one can suggest that we now indeed have a 
polymorphous technology that inscribes, produces, and administrates 
delinquency. 
With these thoughts in mind I wanted to have a conversation with the young 
people we had targeted so that they might find it relevant to their own 
experience; therefore, my research partner and I agreed on an open-ended 
interview technique. We were interested to hear about their experience with 
writing from their perspective. Our questions were only semi-organized; we had 
a variety of questions in our sack depending on various areas he might address. 
We wanted to follow their lead. Before we went out to interview youths, I 
thought about what might make them feel less alienated from the experience. I 
decided that, since self-revelation lowers your status, and the research subjects 
would conceivably see me as somebody of a higher status, I would reveal things 
about myself as part of my method. I wanted to tell them that I too had run into 
problems with juvenile detention at an early age, that I got through high school 
(mediocre grades not withstanding), that I later became a social worker in a 
youth task team in Berlin that was very much like Portland Youth Redirection: it 
had inadequate facilities, was notoriously underfunded, and was kept alive by 
people who obviously loved their work--and that I finally, against all odds, made 
it into the university. For our interview I was hoping that we could set a tone of 
equality, lightness, interest, and let the young men know that we didn't regard 
them as "juvenile offenders" but as three-dimensional people. 
My philosophical premise for our contextual method is therefore a cultural 
materialist one. I would agree with Stuckey that literacy is not the problem; 
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economy is the problem. Even in the relation between race, gender, and literacy, 
the real problem is economy. I would argue further that, although we as teachers 
of writing are paradoxically called to teach academic literacy, we occupy a 
particular place in the network of institutional power-relationships that 
historically functions as a regime of exclusivity as to who masters writing as the 
ultimate technology of power to support the state. We need to be aware of that. 
Even more, I would suggest that we teach our students to be aware of the 
conflicts this contradiction engenders as they affect them. This does not 
constitute indoctrination, as some critics charge, but exposure to critical thinking 
in a historical perspective. Students are well able to make up their own minds 
once they are presented with a chance to think and write critically. 
This is, of course, a revisionist Marxist approach inasmuch as it differs from 
the traditional Western humanist Marxist theory of dialectic materialism that 
argues against Hegel by asserting that consciousness does not determine material 
existence, but rather that our material existence determines our consciousness. 
Although I am fond of that theory, the recent developments of Realsozialismus 
show that it was a faulty one. After all, the Wall did come down in 1989. 
Nonetheless, increasing poverty, gang warfare, and the potential for rising civil 
unrest have not gone away. On the contrary, the economist Rifkin proposes that 
our post-industrial, increasingly computer-oriented production era will bring 
about radical changes of unprecedented dimensions over the next twenty years. 
By radical changes he means that vast areas of production in the US, as well as in 
Third World countries where US companies have production facilities, will 
become obsolete. This trend will bring about mass under- and unemployment, 
particularly in the ethnic working classes, but also in the middle classes. The only 
people with high income potential will be those who are highly trained in 
computer technology and writing. 
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But, before my argument becomes too epic in its proportions, I want to stress 
again that Marx's old theory of consciousness as slave to material conditions is a 
bit too structuralist. One problem Karl Marx had was that he saw his theories of 
dialectic materialism very much as a scientific project. Although this idea is not 
often part of a critique of Marxist dialectics, the fact is that Marx presented his 
theories very forcefully indeed as a positivist project that only had to follow its 
inherent laws to their natural end--not unlike Newton's laws on motion. But 
Marx's structuralism was too static in its assumptions of binary oppositions. In 
retrospect we now can see that the divisions betvveen the classes are not as rigid 
and as inevitable as he and Engels assumed, and that their change, or movements 
if you will, are not as predictable as Newtonian physics would suggest. 
Furthermore, I have confidence in the possibilities of this research project 
because I rely on Foucault's re-definition of power in his History of Sexuality. It is 
a most useful critique of dialectic that also informs much of qualitative research 
theory. In the chapter "On Method" he says that his idea of power does not 
assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the overall unity 
of a domination are given at the outset. Rather, Foucault says, "these are only the 
terminal forms power takes (92). For him, power is everywhere, not because it 
embraces everything, "but because it comes from everywhere." With that in 
mind, power is a "moving substate of fore relations which, by virtue of their 
inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local 
and unstable" (93). These local potentialities of power make qualitative research 
a tool that can tease out local and situated knowledges in highly interesting 
ways. 
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As a result, it seems that the relationship between material conditions and 
consciousness is more complex and less predictable than Marx had thought. At 
the same time, our teaching, our learning, our research, do not happen in a 
classless, value-free space, but are part of a particular material culture that 
implicitly and explicitly teaches and researches in a paradigm of exclusion and 
therefore maintains and reinforces inherited class structures. But, as already 
mentioned, literacy hierarchies are not as monolithic as one might suppose. Still, 
they resist change. 
With these theoretical ideas as part of our methodological basis, we wanted to 
create an inclusionary interview environment. In further preparation for our 
interview I tried to keep in mind that I tend to romanticize oppressed minorities. 
Simultaneously, like most Caucasians who deal with issues of race, I tend to 
objectify the objects of curiosity, even if my gaze is benevolent. To subvert this 
cultural imperialist impulse, I knew that I would show the youths I have 
interviewed everything I write about our conversations. Additionally, I would 
invite their comments and formally acknowledge them as sources for my paper. 
This approach is, of course, one of the crucial ethical elements of qualitative 
research since it is meant to empower the interview partner to critique, change, 
and challenge my researcher assumptions. 
CHAPTER III 
INTERVIEWS WITH YOUTH: 
The Interview that Wasn't 
The following is a thick description of a failed interview with Michael, an 
African American youth. The narration of the attempted interview illustrates 
how it was in fact not possible for me to transcend particular conditions in terms 
of race and, further, how my own underlying ethnocentricity stood in the way of 
my creating a context that was relevant to the youth. I attempted the interview 
with Michael21 at the end of the eighth week of the term. 
On November 12, I went to interview Michael. To meet him at his home, I got 
on the number eight bus at PSU which took me to lower North East Portland. A 
lot of Black people got on as well. I noticed it because usually the busses I take 
carry very few African Americans. It was about 4 pm. The Whites who got on 
had a sharp, I-am-on-top-of-things business air about them; they got off again at 
the Lloyd Center. But the African Americans, many of them youths, had a more 
withdrawn appearance. They all stayed on the bus until after we had passed 
Prescott, which is where the Black neighborhood begins. Sitting on the bus, I was 
trying to tune in to all these young people dressed in primary colors, so I put an 
unobtrusive smile on my face. I started wondering if we could have a 
conversation. I started wondering if I could have a conversation with Michael. 
Would he look like them? How would I look to him? It didn't worry me too 
much, since his grandmother had promised me on the phone that, yes, he'd be 
glad to talk to me. 
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Finally, I got off on the forty-five-hundred block on 15th. Here everybody was 
Black; I was the only White. The houses were run down, very different from the 
ones ten blocks further east where some of my professors 'live. I was looking for 
the right house number when, two houses ahead, I saw a few young people 
standing around an old Chivvy talking to the people inside the car. Ah, I 
thought, they want to check me out. But what if they're doing gang-business? 
No, that's a racist assumption. At the same time, several other large old cars 
were cruising around the block. Hmmm. I wasn't too nervous because I knew 
this atmosphere, so I kept walking.22 vVhen I was maybe fifteen steps away from 
the house, the Chevy pulled away, the other youth walked off, and one boy who 
had obviously seen me approach the house, leisurely walked inside and banged 
the door shut without looking back. Oh great, I thought, I suppose that's 
Michael. I climbed up the stairs to the porch, an old couch in one comer, three 
car tires in the other, and knocked on the screen door. Inside I could see a 
number of people in the living room. It was dar~ inside, everybody was sitting 
around, the TV was on. The young man who I thought was Michael was 
standing in a still darker corner, but I could see him. All in all there were about 
seven or eight people just a few feet away from me, but nobody answered the 
door. So I knocked again. I had an interview to get to. And I knocked again. 
Finally, an older lady came to the door and looked me up and down 
suspiciously. 
"What do you want?" she asked sharply. 
"I'm from PSU. I'm here to see Michael," I said, suddenly feeling like an idiot. 
"What?" she yelled. 
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This had to be grandmother. (It was the same voice, but she didn't acknowledge 
our earlier conversation.) The screendoor had plastic windows, so she couldn't 
hear me very well, but she wouldn't open the door. I hollered back: 
"I'm from PSU!" 
In the back of the livingroom somebody asked what's going on. Grandmother 
turned around and yelled, "It's that woman from the school." 
Oh great, now I was "that" woman. 
"He ain't here." Her eyes were piercing. 
"But," I insisted, "we're supposed to meet at four thirty?" 
"I told you he ain't' here." She was shouting now. 
I, easily cowed by strong matriarchs, hung my head, turned around and left. 
Then I got the strange feeling that I remind the people who live here of these 
Pentecostal missionaries who, with the regularity of bowel movements, arrive at 
their door every other weekend. Very confused, I walked down to the corner to 
call Dr. Gradin. The cars were still cruising. Strangely enough, I didn't mind the 
reaction of Michael''s family. I didn't see it as a manifestation of deviance. On 
the contrary, I had to grin. Still, I felt like the master idiot of the month. 
On my way back to PSU it occurred to me that I might try meeting Michael 
again in a more neutral environment. Our initial idea had been to meet youth in 
an environment they feel at home in, but that hadn't worked out in this case. A 
cafe might be a good place to meet. Just then the bus passed La Charterie, a 
coffee house not ten blocks away from Michael's house. Through the big 
windows I could see intellectuals sitting on graciously iron-wrought French 
garden chairs at equally charming French garden tables, sipping designer coffee, 
reading newspapers or having animated conversations. This looked good to me. 
Needless to say, aJl the coffee-drinkers at La Charterie were White. It was a 
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strange sensation to look into this coffee house from inside a bus filled with 
African Americans. I realized again that segregation continues to function with a 
fairly high degree. I also realized that I can expect to walk into that beautiful cafe 
and not feel out of place because everybody has my color of skin. 
For once, while I was in Michael's neighborhood, I was the minority. For 
once, I could not expect to see people of my color widely represented in the 
environment; for once, I could not expect instant acceptance; for once, I could not 
be sure that if I ask to talk to someone "in charge," I would be facing a person of 
my color; for once, I could not go to a meeting and expect to feel tied in. For one 
brief moment, I was forced instead to feel isolated, out-of-place, held at a 
distance and, worst of all, for once I had to face the fact that people feared me. 
But even in this economically depressed African-American neighborhood I 
can count on being able to choose a public accommodation like a bus without 
fearing discrimination. I can still be sure that, should I need legal or medical 
help, my race will not count against me. I know I can go into a store and pay 
with a check or a credit card without being regarded with suspicion because of 
the color of my skin. Nobody would dare ask me to speak for all the people of 
my ethnic group. I can still tum on the television or look at the front page of the 
newspaper and--unthinkingly--count on seeing people of my race widely 
represented. And, it will be fairly easy for me to get this paper accepted at an 
d . f 23 aca em1c con erence. 
After some thought, I decided not to reschedule an interview with Michael 
because, for one thing, I very much felt like an intruder into his personal life; 
secondly, I couldn't see a way in which I might be able to transcend the 
differences that separated us; and finally, I couldn't think of a way to make my 
research relevant to Michael's experience. 
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THE INTERVIEW THAT WAS, or: 
"Writing could be exciting if we could write a story." 
In the middle of our interview, after we all had relaxed a bit, Roy said: 
"Writing could be exciting if we could write a story." That sounded good to me. I 
like writing stories, too. We had asked him, "What was your worst experience 
writing for school?" "Writing isn't exciting," said Roy, because he and the other 
students had to write for fifty minutes at a time, his fingers get cramped and, 
worst of all, "you've got to write the same thing everybody else writes." "It could 
be exciting," Roy reflected, "if we could write a story, make things up," but this 
way "it's too much stress. You have to read a book first, and then you have to 
write three drafts and make sure the paper is perfect on the fourth one." The way 
I understood Roy was that, well, of course, you have to write research papers for 
school, but it would be great to have more opportunities for self-reflexive and 
creative writing that is not so focused on mechanics, but rather on ideas instead. 
We interviewed Roy on December 5, 1995 at Portland Youth Redirection, 1033 
North Webster in Portland. Early on the class collective had decided to interview 
subjects in an environment that is comfortable for them. Also, we did not want to 
use a questionnaire, but had a list of questions (generated earlier in class), such as: 
If you could write anything you wanted to, what would that be? Therefore, we 
drove to North Portland where PYR is located in an older house on the edge of 
the freeway. Youth Redirection apparently operates with very little funding. It is 
a youth program that aims to create detention alternatives in order to lower 
disproportionally high rates of incarceration of African American youth. As I 
walked into the lobby I saw a little coffee maker (to which I was immediately 
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attracted), children's paintings on the walls, an Ebony magazine, and a poster with 
a Ghanian proverb: "The destruction of a culture begins in its homes." 
Then my research partner and I went to sit in the meeting room where Roy 
joined us a few minutes later. At the beginning of the interview I felt nervous. I 
was trying my best to sit there and look relaxed. My research partner was writing 
furiously. I wanted to put Roy at ease, especially after Ted (Roy's case worker) 
had dragged him into the room like a stubborn calf he had just roped, but that 
didn't work. I felt very much like I was intruding. 
Meanwhile, Ted was saying, "This young man is very intelligent, you know?" 
"I'm sure he is/' I answered. That in turn made Ted say, 11No, I really mean that. 
He is very smart." Now I sounded like I wasn't taking him seriously. Oh great, I 
thought, I'll just shut my big mouth.24 
My research partner and I began our interview with an explanation of our own 
student standing, the purpose of our research, and the personal connections that 
ground our interest in literacy needs of marginal youth. Roy didn't mind my 
small Sony tape recorder during the interview. It seemed to have no obvious 
effect on narration or recall. 
After Roy sat down I remember saying something like, "poor thing, are they 
making you do this?" He answered, "Oh, no. No, I don't mind." But Roy seemed 
very uncomfortable. Therefore, I especially appreciate his patience to listen to us 
and answer our nosy questions. My research partner and I probably came across 
like we were from outer space, and I had no clue what he thought we were going 
to do to him. So, at first we were all a bit nervous, but after a while we relaxed 
and had a conversation. 
In some ways our conversation with Roy brought no big surprises. He has to 
write a lot in school. He doesn't really like his English class because he has to 
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write lots of analytical papers and book reports that he finds alienating because 
they are boring. His assignments are usually on autobiographies of great men 
like Martin Luther King or Abe Lincoln. This work he has to do for a teacher who 
seems also bored, and has little control over the class. "If the teacher's bored, why 
shouldn't we be bored?" Roy asks. Still, he likes to write in his journal and enjoys 
looking back at earlier entries. 
Something that was unexpected for me was the fact that Roy has to write a lot. 
I was surprised, but then I don't have a very clear picture of what high schools 
require from their students. He has to write book reports, do grammar 
corrections on many of his papers, maybe all of them, he does daily extended in-
class writing, and keeps a journal every day. Most of this is boring, Roy says.25 
The journal is the only thing he enjoys writing. 
Later in our discussion Roy mentions an author, L. Duncan, who writes novels. 
Roy was introduced to him through his fourth grade teacher. She would read 
from the novels and the class that would usually terrorize the teacher would 
become quiet. He has read nine of those novels at least, he says. When my 
research partner asked how he would feel if he could write about Duncan for 
school, he says "That would be fun. That would be a lot better, cause that class, 
man, I just want to drop it, but you need it to pass ... " Another thing that bothered 
Roy is being graded down for grammar. Or rather, if I understand him correctly, 
having to go through each paper and correct every single mistake puts the 
greatest importance on mechanics like grammar, punctuation, and sentence 
structures, so that he doesn't really get around to reflecting how he can best say 
what he wants to say. Later Roy told me he doesn't get the impression that the 
teacher is at least as interested in his ideas as he is in the mechanical correctness of 
his writing. His journals, on the other hand, are freewritings. They are not 
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corrected: "It's like you accidentally stutter and you write it down." But, while 
this kind of writing is not as perfect as the drafted essay, it seems to be more 
authentic, more real, more alive, for Roy. His Mom used to read to him every 
night, he remembers. His Dad, too. But Dad would read bible stories. The fairy 
tales were more like adventures in which he could ride along. 
Roy likes to read books that he can relate to. Duncan, he mentions, writes in 
"everyday language" that people actually speak. "There's even cussing in there. 
It's something that someone would really say." Duncan doesn't use highly 
abstracted language. But this kind of connected writing doesn't seem to be a 
possibility in Roy's writing class. As a researcher and teacher I find myself 
thinking about what might engage Roy. I decide, perhaps too quick to avoid 
feeling a bit like The Colonizer, that it might be a good idea to develop a plan in 
which Roy could write a paper on an author he likes, or on no author at all, but 
just write a story about an event that is important to him and arrange with his 
school for credit. Later, after critical reflection and more interviewing, I still think 
this might be a good idea. 
When we ask Roy what he wants to do after high school, he says that he'll 
probably go to college. But later he explains that he's thinking of getting out of 
school with a GED because two more years seem like a waste of time. "And 
people say that you can get just as far with a GED." Roy wants to be a carpenter 
or an electrician like his Dad who lives in Mississippi. That would be his dream 
job, he says. 
During our conversation I was trying to find a way to tell Roy about myself. I 
had this idea in my head that I could tell him that I had been to reform school as a 
youth, that I had been a "juvenile offender," that I ran away from home a lot, that 
we even had a little gang, that I was very close to dropping out of high school, 
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that I later became a social worker. I thought that might be helpful because he 
treated me so much like an authority person that he must have thought my 
background must be lily-white, so to speak. But that seemed impossible. I also 
sensed that Roy didn't want to talk about his involvement with Youth 
Redirection; neither did his case worker. That was none of my business. Fair 
enough. I am glad, though, that we kept the open-ended interview idea in mind, 
because towards the end of our talk I mentioned that I was a returning woman 
student. Roy said, "My Mom is a returning student at PCC Sylvania." That's the 
same campus I started out with. His Mama went back to get her high school 
diploma when she was twenty-five. Roy's Mom goes to school, takes care of her 
husband, cooks, cleans, and takes care of her seven children, too. "You know," 
Roy said, "my Mom has to do the journal thing too.'' Then he told us that he and 
his mom often sit down and read their journals to each other, so "she'll know 
what I've been through for the day." 
At the end of the interview, my research partner and I delineated participant 
rights and researcher responsibilities as carefully and as clearly as possible to Roy. 
But the form we had, while the content was decidedly meant to empower the 
interviewee, was almost impossible to explain. The more I tried, the more I 
sounded like a sleazy insurance salesman. After the transcription of the taped 
interview, Roy received a copy of his transcript for comments or revisions, but he 
hasn't given it back yet. He will also receive a copy of the final draft of this paper. 
The chosen research tools, interviews and self-conscious critical reflection, 
provided useful insights on qualitative research. I think that this interview with 
Roy was a good start. But it was only a start. To make the project work, it is 
really necessary to develop interactions with an organization like Portland Youth 
Redirection on a long-term basis, so that the young men and women there, their 
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counselors and case workers, and the researchers can get to know each other and 
develop a degree of trust that, in tum, will make it possible for them to write with 
us. Otherwise we are only another fly-by-night outfit that pops in, does 
something, and pops out again. That approach to researching literacy needs of 
juvenile offenders entirely defeats the purpose. 
If you recall, our interview with Roy was in December. Since then, I've kept at 
least in sporadic contact with PYR. Now, in May 96, Roy thinks he may want to 
write a little story. Erik, Roy's new case worker, Dr. Gradin and I, now have 
plans to start a small interactive writing group at PYR. We will go visit with their 
groups, but we will also invite them to PSU for writing workshops. Dr. Gradin 
and I both agree that it is a good idea to bring the groups to the campus. 
My critical reflections that will, hopefully, be read by students who continue 
this literacy project, may help avoid some of the pitfalls ENG 510 spent so much 
time scrambling out of again. The interviews and the critical connection between 
public and private discourses of, at least, some university students were 
immensely helpful to me in writing myself out of deafening silences. These 
qualitative research tools have certainly furthered my knowledge around research 
methodology and race. 
CHAPTER IV 
LITTLE HISTORIES AND THE PROBLEM OF SILENCE, or: 
"We know perfectly well that we are not free to say just anything. "26 
I was hoping that I could find some common ground with Roy. But that was 
very difficult. We don't have a whole lot in common. Or perhaps we do, but we 
were strangers to each other, there were a lot of barriers, and he was probably not 
sure what in the world we wanted from him. Therefore, a number of things I 
would have liked to know were impossible to ask. I would have felt even more 
like an intruder. And there were probably a number of things Roy would have 
liked to say, but we only met for a little while. In The Discourse on Language 
Foucault says: "we know perfectly well that we are not free to just say anything, 
when we like or where we like; not just anyone, finally, may speak of just 
anything." We know the prohibitions like we know any other signs of danger. 
Foucault discusses three types of prohibition: "the covering of objects" with 
mantles, "ritual with its surrounding circumstances," and the "exclusive right to 
speak of a particular subject." These prohibitions appear as in a web that 
interrelates, complements and reinforces itself. Note that the area "where the web 
is most tightly woven today, where the danger spots are most numerous, are 
those dealing with politics and sexuality." Sexuality aside, our ideological 
prohibitions in ENG 510 were so powerful because words were not only the 
medium which manifests desire (for knowledge); words were "the very object of 
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man's conflict" (216). In other words, the majority of 510 was comprised of 
practitioners of metanarratives who resisted the methodological challenge to their 
cherished belief that Comtian reason can transcend context. Here the web of 
ideas was most tightly woven; here the "danger spots" of the Self were most 
protected from the dangerous Other. The women in the class identified with this 
Self just as much as the men; as a result, at least in relation to race, the class united 
in silence. 
On the other hand, this silence wasn't quite as monolithic as I portray it here. 
But I kept these quiet tensions in mind as we went to intervie Roy. I didn't want 
to talk to, and about, Roy as if he somehow represented a whole group. 
Question: "Do you as a Black person feel discriminated?" 
Answer: "Well, perhaps just a tiny bit." 
Note: Research subject has quickly recognized the liberal for what she is; 
ergo, he tells her what she wants to hear. He knows perfectly well that 
she doesn't really want to hear about his rage. 
But perhaps she does. Give the woman a chance. I really would have liked to 
know Roy's feelings about race and class. Of course I feel awkward talking 
about African Americans as if I were somehow preoccupied with that problem of 
race when I myself am White and clearly privileged--and, with that, presumably 
very comfortable in the academic environment. Why then would I want to 
bother with other people's problems around race and class? I'm okay; you're 
okay. You can't make it through college. Hey, you'll probably drop out of High 
School, and that's too bad, but we love you anyway. 
I do want to bother with race and class because, in many different ways, it 
relates back to my own experience with institutional normalizing. Writing this 
contextual thesis has forced me to reflect on my own experience with juvenile 
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detention. I haven't discussed it about it in fifteen years. When I was fourteen, 
my parents handed me over to a closed reform school in Berlin. I was always 
running away from home because home wasnt' very nice, or safe, to use a more 
current term. I was released from reform school in 1969, after I had been 
diagnosed with a chronic kidney infection.27 After I got out, I saw Ulrike 
Meinhof's film Bambule. At the time, Meinhof was a social worker concerned with 
the welfare of street youth. In Bambule she showed interviews with street youth. 
In her mind, youth detention facilities were the policeman of the system, "a stick 
with which to beat the proletarian young," and impress upon them that it is no 
use defending themselves, no use wanting anything other than a lifetime on the 
assembly line (73). "Bambule" means rebellion1 resistance, counter violence--
efforts toward liberation. "Such things," she said, "happen mostly in the summer, 
when it is hot, and when the food is even less appealing than usual, and anger 
festers in the corners together with the heat." 
Admittedly, I was very taken with Meinhof's reasoning. There is one sentence 
she said that I remember very clearly: "Such things," Meinhof said, "are in the air 
then--they could be compared to the hot summers in the Black ghettoes of the 
United States" (74). Her film also showed Black ghettoes in, I think, Detroit. To 
add fuel to our resistance ideology, we read James Baldwin and Stokeley 
Carmichael in high school, and Marx, Engels and Bakunin at home, and we began 
hearing about Angela Davis. There's my link to this research project. Another 
silence is made visible. But the problem with revolutionary counter-violence, that 
is, the emancipation of human beings through class struggle--a Marxist idea I 
grew up with--is that it is another one of those grand 19th century metanarratives 
which, according to Lyotard, are dead. He is correct, it seems, although I would 
insist that we have in no way overcome issues of race, class and gender--even if I 
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sound like my needle is stuck. But yes, Marxist ideas of counter-violence are 
dead; Meinhof is dead; positivist science is dead. Qualitative research, on the 
other hand, allows for little histories to be told. It is a creative approach towards 
social justice. 
With Foucault's critique of Marx's dialectic materialism we now know that the 
power structures that keep literacy hierarchies in place are not as rigid as was 
earlier supposed. Their fluidity increasingly allows minorities into the academy, 
although, make no mistake, they do not "trickle in" automatically. 
These are ideas I would really like to tell Roy. He doesn't sound like he's 
particularly interested in finishing high school. I can understand the sentiment; I 
could not see what use a high school degree would be to me. But as a student of 
color with a GED alone the cards are stacked against him even more. I wish 
there were a way Roy could feel encouraged enough to continue with school, 
even if it is difficult. I also want to tell him what Jo Buffalo Boy told me: "Make 
no mistake: there are enough people out there who don't like to see a minority 
student succeed. They may not say it out loud, but you can feel institutional 
resentment surrounding you like a cold fog." Still, college is interesting. If 
nothing else, it is always a good idea to familiarize oneself with the strategies of 
the Master discourse. 
This is a silence Chiseri-Strater talks about when she says that the public and 
private discourses of university students are often radically different. Academic 
success, especially for minority students, often requires such a high degree of 
alienation that, in order to make it, you have to radically dissociate yourself from 
who you are in the world. The more marginalized a student you are, the more 
you have to dissociate yourself from your own cultural context. She includes 
gender issues, but leaves out the impact class and, particularly, race has in that 
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context. But in The Violence of Literacy, Stuckey drags those issues out of the 
underground to the forefront of the discussion. She quotes June Jordan, an 
acclaimed educator, professor of African American Studies and Women's Studies 
at the University of California at Berkeley. Black, female, and politically aware, 
Jordan talks about race and class. According to Jordan, English education closes 
down opportunities for social meaning, especially for minorities and 
untraditional students. "English education should stop doing this," she says (97). 
While I certainly don't mean to idealize Meinhof (a dangerous enterprise, to be 
sure) I am encouraged by June Jordan's articulate grievances against quietly 
exclusionary practices that are similar to those I try to address as the silences we 
produced in 510. To transform this dynamic it is necessary to discuss, to speak 
the words, that make these silences visible, particularly in a qualitative research 
project that makes this kind of awareness and a degree of discomfort imperative. 
Therefore, even if it feels strange to talk about somebody else's race--even if 
there's always a degree of interracial stutter one has to get through to make a 
dialogue possible--we still might want to try to sustain that, live with the tension, 
the vague discomfort, and the not knowing how things will go, rather than ignore 
the impact that race has on people's life experience and educational success. That 
is why I brought Peggy Mcintosh's short essay on white privilege into the 
research methods class for reading and discussion. But still, our class more or less 
draped a fleece of golden silence over race, class, and gender. This prohibition of 
speech might have been disrupted if there had been even one African American 
or one Hispanic or one Native American student in there. 
Let me define racism as I understand it. Racism combines prejudice with 
power. Racism is the routine, institutionalized mistreatment of a person based on 
her /his membership in a group on the downside of power. Racism is a 
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catastrophe for every person. Racism is based on lies. Racism is interwoven with 
class issues. Racism is damaging to you whether you are on the giving end or the 
receiving end of it. Personal prejudice becomes racism if it is backed up by 
institutional power. People of color do not have institutional power. That is, they 
are not represented in any institutions in the US in proportion to their numbers in 
the population. Here it becomes evident how class and race are interlocking 
realities that serve to maintain traditional educational structures. People of color 
are underrepresented as teachers, lawyers, business people, police, doctors, 
dentists, politicians, plumbers, construction workers, etc. At the same time, 
people of color are disproportionally found in prisons, low-paying jobs, housing 
projects, .unemployed and receiving inadequate diets and medical care. These 
facts represent racism in institutional power relationships as we live in them. 
Racism affects all areas of our lives, political, economical, social and personal. 
We who are here, in moderate positions of power, one might say, can either 
enforce these hierarchies or break them down. The methods through which we 
teach or, in this case, research have a direct influence in this power network. 
There are a number of us, students and teachers, who think that our own 
activities, because we have a degree of awareness of underlying structures, are 
somehow innocent of such dynamics. We prefer reading passionate theoreticians 
to re-examining our own practices. But that is exactly what we have to do. That 
is what I mean with self-reflexivity, not only on an individual level but also in 
terms of institutional dynamics, and in terms of a research methodology. And, 
while we as educators may be able to say that racism is not our fault, taking action 
against racism through the way we teach and research is certainly our 
responsibility. This was the intent of ENG 510, but for many varied reasons, one 
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of them a desire for a teacher-centered over a communal classroom, the majority 




The Violence of Literacy as Enlightenment Despotism 
..... The Enlightenment returns: but not at all as a way for the West to become conscious of 
its actual possibilities and freedoms to which it can have access, but as a way to question 
the limits and the powers it has abused. Reason -- the despotic Erlightenment. 
Foucault, The Nonna! And The Pathological 
It doesn't seem that our critical consciousness regarding racism has advanced 
much over the basic assumptions of nineteenth century thinkers like Kant, Hegel 
or Comte. In a recent (March 13, 1996) PSU Vanguard article titled "PSU Proves 
to be Free of Racism," the author explains that at PSU racism is really 
nonexistent, and if there are racial incidents they are nothing but a problem of 
miscommunication. The article was written to contrast PSU' s progressive 
multicultural stance to a racial incident at another university earlier that week, 
where White students kicked and spit on Black students. In my response to the 
Editor (April 5, 96) I expressed that the article struck me as a bad joke. If PSU 
were free of racism, I argued, we would have lower drop-out rates for minority 
students, and we would have proportionally more people of color in positions of 
institutional power. That is not the case. I wrote: "So, let's not act as if our brains 
had been surgically removed at an early age and we somehow can't seem to 
remember the procedure." My tone was not meant to be a conciliatory. My body 
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metaphor was meant to polemicize this insidious faith in reason that was nothing 
but a veiled insult to ethnic minorities--cloaked as progess on the march. It 
would be fair to say that my research in 510, particularly the insights I have 
gained through the methodological tool of critital reflection, has allowed me to 
speak an otherwise unspoken sentiment in an at least somewhat public arena. 
In his "Genealogy of Modern Racism" Corne! West chooses another 
entertaining body metaphor. He speaks of "significant secretions" generated 
from the creative fusion of scientific investigation, Cartesian philosophy, and 
classical aesthetic norms. At the end of the essay it becomes altogether clear that 
he is referring to bowel movements, the fumes and secretions of which "continue 
to pollute the air of our postmodern times" (486). The irony is that I, with all my 
enlightened little insights, cannot transcend race or class as part of an intricately 
interlocking regime of exclusion. All the same, the reflexive stance of our project 
has lead me to realizations I would not otherwise have had. One thing I realize is 
that such a project needs more time. If future researchers give ideas and contacts 
more time to develop, it will become easier for all parties involved to realize the 
actual freedoms to which writing can give access. 
That is why I, together with Dr. Gradin, am still in contact with Roy and two 
case workers at Portland Youth Redirection. As I mentioned earlier, PYR 
provides support to youth. It is meant to nurture and encourage youths who are 
otherwise drawn to gang membership, which also provides a kind of support 
system--along with violence, drug abuse, and a possible criminal record. PYR 
also has a program for young women and men that provides counseling and 
access to jobs, housing and other necessities to young people who want to escape 
gang involvement. The primary goal of PYR is to reduce the over-representation 
of youth of color in secure detention; rather it seeks to hold them accountable in a 
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supervised but less restrictive manner. In that context PSU's Writing Program can 
play a role. Following the ideas of Eric Dunn, a case worker at PYR, the Director 
of Writing and I are planning to initiate small writing groups that can meet, write, 
think, and discuss in an environment that allows them to make writing a tool for 
self-expression. Here the Writing Center may be a helpful nexus. Not only are 
we invited to participate in group activities at PYR, we also encourage supervised 
groups to come into the university. 
Since this project will continue in another methods class, I have a number of 
suggestions for potential qualitative researchers: 
1. A sound theoretical basis would be helpful. 
2. Historical consciousness is a good thing; so is a sense of humor. 
3. Think about screening people before they engage in fieldwork. 
4. Use a pedagogy that openly declares itself to be uncomfortable to 
students. (I think here of bell hooks' ideas in "Towards a Revolutionary Feminist 
Pedagogy.") 
5. Make clear that feeling safe is not as much a concern as continued and 
rigorously displacing self-reflexivity. 
6. Students might be told at the outset that they have to participate in the 
discussion. If they don't think they can handle it, they should consider dropping 
the class. 
7. Bring minority speakers into the classroom (and I would include 
women here. Johanna Brenner strikes me as an excellent possibility). I know 
from Candice Goucher of Black Studies that this department has any number of 
teachers who frequently train on minority sensitivity. 
8. Make the students read this paper. 
9. Make students read related texts written by minority scholars. 
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10. Begin arranging interviews early in the term. 
11. Try to get funds so that this qualitative research methods class can be 
taught over a full school year. 
12. Get a sense of solidarity that goes beyond the diarrhetic Victorian 
desire to help, because that particular hobby mostly serves to purify the soul of 
the colonizer while it leaves surrounding souls feeling more sullied than before. 
That is what I would call the violence of literacy in which we participate more 
often than not. 
Therefore I should like to repeat that, while we as teachers of writing are 
paradoxically called to teach academic literacy, we must be conscious of the fact 
that we occupy a place in the network of institutional power-relationships that 
historically functions as a regime of exclusivity as to who masters writing as the 
ultimate technology of power to support the state. 
Let me then, without any carefully delineated transition, go on to the last point 
I want to make. One of the more painful things I have learned about gender 
through this project is that, while, generally spaking, men easily grant that 
women are disadvantaged (silenced, in our case), they have a great resistance to 
acknowledging that they are over-privileged. Men want to improve women's 
status, but if that means to lessen their own privilege, the disadvantaged 
suddenly hit a brick wall. Denials such as this manifested in our research 
methods class. The denial of male privilege served to protect that same male 
privilege from being lessened or even discussed. 
Perhaps the most difficult thing I have become aware of, is that we (women 
included) were engaged in white privilege. In ENG 510 our denial of white 
privilege amounted to a more radical and perhaps more insidious silence, 
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considering the circumstances of the research project and its subjects. The issue of 
race became a taboo, invisible, erased. As Enlightenment thinkers it was easy 
enough for us to grant that ethnic minorities are disadvantaged. But when that 
realization demanded--even if only in thought alone--that we give up some of our 
"unearned assets" which we have stashed away in our invisible backpack, and on 
which we cash in every day, we became accountable in a way that was altogether 
too uncomfortable. Whites have been taught that racism is something that puts 
others at a disadvantage, but, Mcintosh argues, White persons are carefully 
taught to not recognize the privilege they carry (264). 
If, then, qualitative research on the literacy needs of juvenile offenders is to be 
successful, it is necessary not to assume that our goal is to make our research 
subjects more like us. To do so defeats the research and reifies the power 
structure that limits literacy to disenfranchised youth. It may well be necessary 
that we become more like them. Who knows, perhaps we already are juvenile 
offenders of a different kind? In that case, we are also in need of -detention 
alternatives. 
NOTES 
1 The title is borrowed from chapter one of Foucault's The History of 
Sexuality: An Introduction, which is subtitled in the French edition as "La Volante 
de Savoir," "The Will to Knowledge." 
2 
Paraphrase of Wordsworth's dictum on the composition of poetry as 
expressed in the 1849 Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrical Ballads. 
3 From: Bell Hooks' "Toward a Revolutionary Feminist Pedagogy," in 
Richter's Falling into Theory. 
4 To be sure, though, I should say that Hegel's dialectic of ideal thought 
initially did not have the metallic clang that we often attribute to it now. In his 
early writing he reveals that he is, in fact, moved by a great and desiring love for 
knowledge. In that sense, my quick and dirty dismissal of Hegel is just that: 
quick and dirty. But, as mentioned already, it wasn't Hegel's fault. We have, I 
would propose, constructed a Hegel who is all we have on Hegel. 
5 
In: Comel West's "A Genealogy of Modern Racism," in Appelby' s 
Knowledge and Postmodernism in Historical Perspective. 
6 When I asked Eric Dunn, case worker at Portland Youth Redirection, if 
he thought I was overstating the issue of race, he answered, "Oh, no. I think you 
are right on target." 
7 After all, there is Affirmative Action, although, and I hardly need to 
mention it, the purpose of its existence is questioned. 
8 In Zygmunt Bauman's Modernity and the Holocaust. 
9 You will have noticed that we live in an era of "posts." The term 
connotes a kind of genealogy. First there was modernism, positivism, 
industrialism; then there was post-modernism, postpositivism, and 
postindustrialism. The list suggests a timeline. But it seems that someone like 
Vico or Augustine could easily be named a postmodernist. Sor Juana Ines and 
Hildegard von Bingen were postmodernists, although they were not aware of 
that particular ontology. The point is that none of them put their faith in a 
philosophy of reason that will explain the true nature of universal laws. In any 
case, one thing is clear: postmodernism cannot exist on its own without 
constantly groping back to what it resists. 
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Often critics (like Habermas) dismiss postmodernism as cynicism that thinks of 
itself as the only subversive reason left after the failures and broken promises of 
western Marxism in the 1970s and '80s. Here Peter Sloterdijk's Critique of Cynical 
Reason offers a very helpful argument that leads out of false oppositions, 
accusations and counter-accusations, and offers alternative methods. Similarly, 
thinkers like Foucault, Haraway, or North dance away from these false and 
increasingly bitter oppositions toward a more playful renaming and reestimation 
and recreation of science as art. 
10 in: Knowledge and Postmodernism in Historical Perspective. Ed. Joyce 
Appelby et al. New York: Routledge, 1996. This is a very useful reader that 
unravels the concept of "postmodernism" through the re-presentation of primary 
Enlightenment texts and juxtaposes them with a wide variety of postmodernist 
responses. 
11 
"Veni! Vidi! Vici! 
12 
Gesa Kirsch' s "Methodological Pluralism" in Methods and Methodology 
in Composition Research. 
13 In Women: Images and Realities. A 1995 multicultural reader that 
Johanna Brenner and I used in last Fall's Introduction to Women's Studies class, 
because it covers a wide variety of views on race, class, and gender in relation to 
socio-economic contexts for women. 
14 
We should not lose sight of the fact that the creation of American 
research universities was strongly modeled after nineteenth century German 
university research methods through the efforts of the university presidents of 
Harvard, Yale, and Stanford. Postmodern scholars like Kimball in Orators and 
Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education, or Toulmin in Cosmopolis: The 
Hidden Agenda of Modernity, argue along these lines by saying that it was, at least 
in part, through the methodological paradigm developed in philology that the 
sciences were encouraged to develop experimental models that no longer 
searched for meaning (they no longer asked the naive "Why?" question--the 
"What does it all mean?" question was now relegated to the study of classical 
literature as character builder--but rather researchers now asked the more 
scientific question "How does it (the text, the phenomenon) work? 
15 
Paraphrased and translated by me from Hegel's Vorlesungen iiber die 
Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, book two, "Die orientalische Welt. 
16 
It goes without saying that, through the work of anthropologists like 
Levi-Strauss and the later Landrine, the concept of race cannot at close scrutiny 
be clearly delineated without revealing an underlying racist ideology. 
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17 
In Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through 
Society, Bruno Latour makes that point even in relation to the discovery of the 
structure of DNA. He doesn't argue that DNA really has a different structure; 
rather, he traces how, within the socio-economic and political power networks in 
which scientists and research institutes are embedded, at a particular point 
researchers "agree" on the structural facts of DNA. 
18 
Martin Bernal continues this discussion in his Black Athena, where he 
not only suggest that the genealogy of Western civilization never was a 
disinterested enterprise, but he also proposes that it just may be possible that 
classical Greek civilization had in fact adopted much cultural knowledge from 
the Asian and African continents. Many historians fiercly oppose this in their 
view "outrageous" claim; they tend to dismiss him for a "sloppy" methodology. 
Once again method is the culprit. 
19 For a closer discussion of this idea see Stephen Toulmin's Cosmopolis: 
The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. 
20 
Initially, this sentence read "the state produces juvenile offenses ... " I 
changed offenses to offenders because as a part of a criminalizing economy we not 
only produce juvenile delinquency as an attribute, but we create an ontology of 
criminality. One is a juvenile offender; one is a sexual molester; one is a criminal. 
Once the pathological ontology becomes true, it seems fairly clear how it must be 
contained. 
21 Th' . h' 1 IS IS not IS rea name. 
22 By "I knew this atmosphere" I mean to say that I used to live on the 
Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota, while I was married (my 
daughter is one half Oglala Sioux). The living conditions on Pine Ridge in the 
1970's were pretty much comparable to those of Third World countries, haven't 
changed all that much over the last twenty years, and therefore are a rural 
variant of the urban ghetto, which is why the atmosphere in this part of North 
Portland struck me as oddly familiar. 
23 
The two above passages are a paraphrase of Peggy Mcintosh' s "White 
Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Backpack," to be found in Kesselman' s 
Women: Images and Realities. 
24 In fact, and I hope Eric and Roy read this, the idea that Roy is 
intelligent is pretty much a given for me. I have this theory that young people 
generally are very intelligent. Usually, it's circumstances outside their control 
that lead to problems our youth experience. 
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25 After having lived on the reservation I have to think twice when I hear 
someone use the term "boring:" In the Lakota (Sioux) language there is no word 
for boring. I don't speak Lakota fluently, but while I was translating for a Native 
American delegation who at the time worked with the Committee for Non-
represented Nations on land- and water rights at the United Nations in Geneva, 
one of the delegates, Wallace Black Elk, who speaks a kind of Lakota-English, 
told a member of the press who had asked if he weren't bored with the 
proceedings, that there was no word for "boring" in Lakota. In Lakota, Mr. Black 
Elk said, the only way I could express that I am boredwould be to say "I am 
lonely." 
This struck me as an interesting twist in concepts. Now, every time I hear 
people say "I'm bored," I wonder if they're lonely. 
26 
From Foucault's "Discourse on Language." Appendix in The 
Archaeology of Knowledgee. 
27 In the reform school Haus Heilbronn ("Healing Fountain") we regularly 
received cold water treatments as one method to develop character. I often 
refused to eat, but had to sit at the table, sometimes for several hours, until I had 
eaten all the food. At one point I started wetting the bed. To punish me, the 
group supervisor forced me to lie in the wet bed during afternoon naps. She also 
made sure everybody knew I was a bed-wetter. I got out after I became sick. 
I already knew that I would not go home again. I was lucky enough to be 
taken in by a group of social workers who lived and worked together in a youth 
project in my part of town. Later, I started working with the Youth Task Team 
and so was able to finance myself until I finished high school. 
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APPENDIX 
List of Proposed Questions: 
ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS 
Instead of particular questions, we 





P = Self (Personal) 
We intend to imply these categories 
into the discussion as fluidly as 
possible (i.e., we may start on the 
periperal and move towards the 
deeper stuff.) 
What do you think about school? 
SEQ POSSIBLE FOLLOW UP INQUIRY 
s Describe the English class (reading/writing) 
that you feel you got the most out of. 
teacher atmosphere material feedback 
What would you do if you could do P 
anything in the world you wanted 
to do? 
What are some of the things you 
are good at? 
Have you ever had a teacher you 
liked? What made him/her special? 
Tell me about the last time you had 
to write something. 
(What was the last thing you had 
to write?) 
Tell me about the last thing you 
wrote. 
P What things do you enjoy doing? 
S If "no," what would a good teacher be like? 
What has your experience with school been 
like so far? 
HSPA Do you like to write? 
What kind of writing do you usually do? 
Do you think you could write a story about a 
day in your life or about a member of the group 
you hang out with? 
How are reading and writing part of your day? 
What kinds of books or magazines do you like 
to read? 
This differs from the last question in 
that this allows for personally 
motivated writing as opposed to 
assigned writing. 
If you could create your own class 
for school, what would it be like? 
While you were growing up, did 
anybody in your family sit down 
and read with you? 
What kind of TV do you like to A 
watch? 
If you were asked to write about 
something--anything you wanted 
to write about--what would you 
write? 
If you could read anything, what 
would that be? 
Do you have a favorite author? 




How do you feel about reading and writing? 
competence personal validation 
What (conditions or circumstances) make you 
want to read or write? 
Did you or anybody in your family, or maybe 
your friends, ever make up stories to tell each 
other? If so, did you ever write any of them 
down? 
What is your favorite show? 
Who are some of your favorite characters? 
Why? 
p Describe the best, an the worst, writing 
experience you have ever had. 
P Describe the best, and worst, reading 
experience you have ever had. 
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